Copyright’s Memory Hole by Goldman, Eric & Silbey, Jessica
BYU Law Review 
Volume 2019 Issue 4 Article 6 
Summer 8-21-2020 
Copyright’s Memory Hole 
Eric Goldman 
Jessica Silbey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eric Goldman and Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 929 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2019/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 




Copyright’s Memory Hole 
Eric Goldman,* Jessica Silbey** 
There is growing interest in using copyright to protect the privacy and 
reputation of people depicted in copyrighted works. This pressure is driven 
by heightened concerns about privacy and reputation on the Internet, plus 
copyright’s plaintiff-favorable attributes compared to traditional privacy 
and reputation torts. 
The Constitution authorizes copyright law because its exclusive rights 
benefit society by increasing our knowledge. But copyright law is being 
misdeployed by suppressing socially valuable works in a 
counterproductive attempt to advance privacy and reputation interests. 
This results in “memory holes” in society’s knowledge, analogous to those 
discussed in George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984. 
This Article identifies some limited circumstances where copyright’s 
goals are benefited by considering privacy and reputational interests. In 
other circumstances, treating copyright law as a general-purpose privacy 
and reputation tort harms us all. 
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Copyright law encourages the production and dissemination of 
socially valuable works by giving the creator (or a designee) some 
control over the works’ dissemination. This control allows 
copyright owners to establish and manage distribution channels for 
their works and stop competitive free-riding on the creator’s 
investments. When this paradigm works properly, society benefits 
from the knowledge disseminated in copyrighted works, which 
advances the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience.”1 
It is an essential feature of copyright law that copyright owners 
can suppress their works from the public. Indeed, there are many 
circumstances where such suppression advances copyright’s goals. 
For example, windowed releases (when the works temporarily 
have limited or no distribution) can help copyright owners 
maximize their overall economic returns,2 and the suppression of 
unpublished works can spur their production and development.3 
	
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In eighteenth-century parlance, “science” in this context 
means “knowledge.” See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF 
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 48 (1991) (“[T]he word science retains its eighteenth-
century meaning of ‘knowledge or learning.’”); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual 
Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006); Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from 
Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 376 (2002) (“‘Science’ means ‘knowledge’ in an 
anachronistically broad sense.”); Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 259 (2013); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 51 (1994) (“[I]n the latter part of the eighteenth century 
‘science’ was synonymous with ‘knowledge’ and ‘learning.’”). 
 2.  E.g., Matt Schruers, The Public Costs of Private Distribution Strategies: Content Release 
Windows as Negative Externalities, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/060215-the-public-costs-of-private-
distribution-strategies-content-release-windows-as-negative-externalities. 
 3.  See infra Part B. There are other reasons copyright owners may suppress the 
publication of unpublished works, including for reasons related to relationship building or 
preservation, and reasons unrelated to economic situations. Copyright law is not practically 
limited to economic motives. See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, 
INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 274–85 (2015) [hereinafter SILBEY, 
EUREKA MYTH] (summarizing empirical findings from within various creative and 
innovative communities that demonstrate multiple bases for asserting copyright claims 
beyond utilitarian and economic reasons); Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why 
Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–58 (2015). Further, 
we understand that “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” is a broad and evolving mandate 
that includes generating copyrighted works and increasing knowledge and understanding 
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The Internet’s popularity has accelerated interest in a 
qualitatively different type of suppression, where copyright 
owners target works for suppression based on privacy or 
reputational concerns. Sometimes, the continued online publication 
of works causes severe and life-changing consequences. For 
example, people may support legal recourse—including copyright 
law—for nonconsensual pornography victims to stop further 
publication.4 Copyright’s doctrinal features make it a potent legal 
tool to redress these and other sympathetic situations. As a result, 
it can be tempting to turn copyright law into an all-purpose tool for 
suppressing content online. 
Unfortunately, when deployed as a general-purpose tort, 
copyright law also can cause over-suppression.5 People concerned 
about their privacy or reputation can “weaponize” copyright law 
to suppress works that they personally object to but that otherwise 
benefit society’s knowledge base.6 Unlike other laws custom-built 
for those purposes, copyright law was not designed to be a general-
purpose privacy- or reputation-enhancing law. As a result, 
copyright law lacks the doctrinal features necessary to 
accommodate privacy and reputational considerations and still 
yield the expected social benefits from copyrighted works.7 
Copyright over-suppression brings to mind the fictional 
Ministry of Truth’s “memory hole” in George Orwell’s dystopian 
	
through creative expression in a variety of ways. See Jessica Silbey, Promoting Progress: A 
Qualitative Analysis of Creative and Innovative Production, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 515, 517–18 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert eds., 2014) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (citing scholarship on the meaning of “progress”). 
 4.  E.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014); Margaret Chon, 
Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364 (2016); Andrew Gilden, Sex, 
Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67 (2018). But see Rebecca Tushnet, How 
Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346 (2014) (responding to Bambauer). 
 5.  Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: 
Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 16 (2016) 
(“[C]opyright could have a censorial effect on specific instances of offensive speech or 
unpleasant facts.” (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,  
559 (1985))). 
 6.  Cf. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018) (Fox News 
restricted a third party news aggregator database to prevent its clips from being used to 
criticize the network); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding 
that an author’s control over unpublished letters supersedes third parties’ rights to publish 
extracts under fair use). 
 7.  Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Owners’ Putative Interests in Privacy, Reputation, and 
Control: A Reply to Goold, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 36, 45–46 (2017); Tushnet, supra note 4. 
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novel 1984, which permanently erased documents containing 
embarrassing or inconvenient accounts of the past. Copyright can 
create the legal analogue of a memory hole. Copyright’s memory 
holes may not be motivated by authoritarianism, but the 
consequences for society are no less perilous. The resulting 
depletion of knowledge paradoxically conflicts with the 
Constitutional justification of copyright law to promote the 
progress of knowledge. This Article explores that paradox. 
This Article proceeds as follows. The first Part briefly explains 
the memory hole analogy. The second Part describes the legal 
landscape regarding privacy and reputation management online 
and why copyright law has emerged as a popular choice for 
privacy- and reputation-management. The third Part provides a 
taxonomy, with several case studies, of how copyright owners try 
to create memory holes and explains why these efforts are 
pernicious. The fourth Part explores when privacy considerations 
might complement or conflict with copyright’s goals. The fifth and 
final Part suggests some reform proposals to restrict misuse of 
copyright’s memory hole. 
I. THE MEMORY HOLE ANALOGY 
George Orwell’s novel 1984 described a censorious government 
that restricts all efforts at free speech. One of the government’s 
speech-control tools was the memory hole: 
In the walls of the cubicle there were three orifices. To the right of 
the speakwrite, a small pneumatic tube for written messages, to 
the left, a larger one for newspapers; and in the side wall, within 
easy reach of Winston’s arm, a large oblong slit protected by a 
wire grating. This last was for the disposal of waste paper. Similar 
slits existed in thousands or tens of thousands throughout the 
building, not only in every room but at short intervals in every 
corridor. For some reason they were nicknamed memory holes. 
When one knew that any document was due for destruction, or 
even when one saw a scrap of waste paper lying about, it was an 
automatic action to lift the flap of the nearest memory hole and 
drop it in, whereupon it would be whirled away on a current of 
warm air to the enormous furnaces which were hidden 
somewhere in the recesses of the building.8 
	
 8.  GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 34–35 (Penguin Books 1954) (1949). 
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The memory holes in 1984 are designed to remove ideas,  
facts, and expressions from human society, which creates gaps  
in society’s information and knowledge. The information in  
the destroyed papers may linger in human minds, only to be 
forgotten eventually.  
A miscalibrated copyright law can cause similar consequences. 
Copyright law may only protect the expression of ideas and facts,9 
not the facts or ideas themselves, but controlling copyrightable 
expression can be enough to effectively suppress the underlying 
ideas and facts being expressed. Thus, copyright law can hinder 
and potentially reverse truth-seeking processes, expressive 
diversity, and the progress of science that copyright law aims to 
promote. In the worst-case outcomes, memory holes can facilitate 
the rewriting of history10 and undermine resistance to authority 
figures who may not be acting in the community’s best interests.11 
Admittedly, the memory hole analogy is imperfect. 1984 
addressed government censorship, while this Article addresses 
private actors who seek to protect their privacy or reputation. We 
expect (sometimes over-optimistically) that the government tries to 
benefit its constituents, which makes censorship—especially one 
designed to support or protect the government’s power and 
authority—an unconscionable affront to the public welfare. In 
contrast, copyright law by design assumes that copyright owners 
will maximize their private welfare, so it is not surprising or 
inherently anti-social when copyright owners do that (even if by 
suppressing speech). Still, the memory hole analogy highlights how 
the control or censorship of facts and ideas (and the expressive 
works that communicate them) can hurt society, whether it is done 
by the government or private citizens. 
Also, the Ministry of Truth’s memory hole effectively erases all 
traces of the suppressed material. The system targeted not only the 
pieces of paper but also the facts and ideas they contain for the 
memory hole. In contrast, copyright cannot suppress facts or ideas, 
so facts and ideas from a suppressed work can be extracted pre-
	
 9.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018). 
 10.  See, e.g., ORWELL, supra note 8, at ch. 4 (“The past was alterable. The past never  
had been altered. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. Oceania had always been at war  
with Eastasia.”). 
 11.  See, e.g., id. at 39–40 (“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the 
present controls the past.”). 
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suppression and then freely disseminated in other works without 
further intervention from copyright. Thus, copyright’s memory 
hole is less thorough and effective than the Ministry of Truth’s. 
Nevertheless, suppressing copyrighted works can relegate the 
facts and ideas which those works contain to persisting only in 
people’s memories.12 With the works suppressed, those facts and 
ideas can fade out of circulation—and eventually fade away 
altogether.13 Alternatively, when copyright law suppresses the 
source of facts or ideas, it can remove the most credible evidence to 
validate or contest those facts and ideas, creating opportunities to 
undermine the search for truth in the first place.14 
Thus, despite its limits, the memory hole analogy has some 
explanatory value. Imagine the relevant universe of known content 
as a large fabric sheet. Successful litigation based on suppressing 
copyrighted content tears little pieces of fabric out of the sheet—
leaving holes where the knowledge used to be. These holes 
represent gaps in our knowledge caused by copyright. Should the 
holes become too numerous or too large, they threaten the integrity 
of the entire sheet. 
In other words, when copyright owners suppress published 
content for their private benefit, their actions in the aggregate can 
negatively affect us all. Orwell’s memory holes served 
totalitarianism fueled by ignorance. Copyright’s memory holes 
may not advance totalitarianism, but the consequences may be 
dystopian nevertheless. By facilitating the selective suppression of 
	
 12.  Cf. Fromer, supra note 3 (discussing how recluse tycoon Howard Hughes tried to 
control literary material about him by acquiring exclusive rights to the stories). 
 13.  See id. at 571 (“When rightsholders want to protect their privacy or reputation, they 
frequently care less about keeping protected expression out of the public eye and more about 
keeping private unprotected facts or ideas.”); cf. RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953) 
(involving efforts to keep the memories of burned books alive through oral transmission). 
Admittedly, sometimes a person may want their memories to fade, but they should not be 
able to force other people’s memories to fade or be forgotten entirely. For further discussion 
of this point, see infra Part 3, discussing “nostalgic remembrances.” 
 14.  Of course, not all copyrighted works clarify facts and ideas; works can mislead 
and distort as well. However, First Amendment doctrine, which copyright law incorporates, 
tends to favor more speech to clarify and correct false or misleading speech instead of its 
censorship or erasure. This is known as the “counterspeech doctrine,” and while not always 
an optimal solution, especially when time is of the essence, it is deeply rooted in 
constitutional law. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the  
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not  
enforced silence.”). 
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information for private benefit, copyright can shape how society 
thinks—one of the key preconditions for 1984’s dystopia. The 
copyright memory hole analogy helpfully highlights these stakes. 
II.  WHY COPYRIGHT IS USED TO CREATE MEMORY HOLES 
In the digital age, people seek—sometimes desperately—legal 
recourse to suppress undesirable information about them. Where 
some United States law makes such efforts difficult, including the 
First Amendment and speech-enhancing statutes like Section  
230, copyright law has emerged as a tool of choice to create  
memory holes. 
A. Reputation vs. Privacy 
This Article discusses people’s privacy and reputation 
considerations, sometimes freely switching between the two 
concepts despite their different objects of concern. However, for 
this Article’s purpose, privacy and reputation law share the same 
motivations and consequences of their deployment. 
People routinely deploy both privacy- and reputation-
management laws to control how other people think about them.15 
This similarity is especially apparent when a person’s image is 
widely used and copied to expose the private information it 
depicts, such as a politician engaging in a scandalous but private 
sexual affair. In these circumstances, privacy and reputation laws 
both serve the same purpose of controlling the image’s display. 
Moreover, the Internet’s critical role in our modern society 
compounds the overlap between privacy and public reputation. 
The Internet increasingly dominates our information flows. The 
Internet’s potential global visibility raises the stakes on reputation 
formation and management and correspondingly shrinks the zones 
of personal privacy. A person’s reputation can be instantly—and 
sometimes permanently—defined by a single, “private,” and minor 
incident that is publicized on the Internet.16 Affected individuals 
	
 15.  There are surely circumstances where a person or company may be interested in 
privacy for reasons that have nothing to do with reputation, as we discuss infra in Part B, 
where we critique copyright law as a suppression tool. 
 16.  For example, a South Korean woman who failed to clean up her dog’s excrement 
gained worldwide recognition as the “Dog Poop Girl” after a video of her inaction went  
viral. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON  
THE INTERNET 2 (2007). In another example, public relations professional Justine  
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scramble to find legal tools to successfully reestablish control over 
their public identity. Both privacy and reputation laws can serve as 
those tools. 
The legal protections for privacy (especially common law 
privacy torts17) and for reputation (especially defamation) share 
common doctrinal features. They both govern the dissemination of 
information, have similar remedies, and are subject to significant 
First Amendment limits. Indeed, they are often lumped together in 
legal taxonomies and fields of study.18 
To the extent there is a difference between reputation and 
privacy, this Article focuses on the copyright/privacy interface—
that is, efforts to treat copyright law like privacy law. Copyright 
law has other provisions that bear directly or indirectly on 
professional and authorial reputation, such as moral rights that 
allow visual artists to control their reputation when connected with 
a work of art;19 protections for copyright notices;20 and protections 
for copyright management information21 that help an author 
associate a work with his or her name. The interfaces between these 
specific statutory provisions and other tort-based reputation 
protection laws are beyond this Article’s scope.22 
	
Sacco’s reputation was globally defined by a twelve-word tweet. Jon Ronson, How One  
Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-
life.html; Ali Vingiano, This Is How a Woman’s Offensive Tweet Became the World’s Top Story, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 21, 2013, 8:36 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alisonvingiano/this-
is-how-a-womans-offensive-tweet-became-the-worlds-top-s. 
 17.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 18.  For example, the American Law Institute has a restatement project for 
“Defamation and Privacy.” Four Restatement Projects Launch, AM. L. INST. (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/four-restatement-projects-launch/. The professional 
association for law professors (AALS) has a similar special interest section.  See Section on 
Defamation & Privacy, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/sections/list/ 
defamation-and-privacy/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). See generally 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW 
OF DEFAMATION § 10:10 (2019) (discussing difficulties distinguishing defamation from false 
light privacy). 
 19.  17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018). 
 20.  Id. § 506(c)–(d). 
 21.  Id. § 1202. 
 22.  The effectiveness of the U.S. moral rights regime has been broadly debated and 
comes under attack from both sides (for weaker or stronger moral rights). Compare with Amy 
M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (2009), with Justin Hughes, 
American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659. The First 
Amendment limits the reach of a moral rights regime in the United States, in contrast to 
Europe. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, in LANDMARK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 
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B. Copyright’s Quid Pro Quo 
The U.S. Constitution contemplates a quid pro quo to justify 
copyright protection of expressive works in order to promote the 
progress of science. Authors can receive “the exclusive [r]ight to 
their respective [w]ritings”23 in exchange for society receiving the 
benefit of those works circulating in society under various market 
conditions. This quid pro quo improves society if the circulating 
works contribute to the diffusion of cultural production and the 
accumulation of knowledge. 
Superficially, it may seem counterintuitive that copyright can 
enhance society’s knowledge by restricting the flow of copyrighted 
works. However, some types of dissemination restrictions can 
increase incentives to create the works. For example, controlling or 
superseding older works may improve readership of and financial 
returns from a subsequent work.24 The student textbook market 
partially relies upon this.25 Also, a copyright owner might 
experiment with multiple genres of works, and then decide to 
suppress some genres to cultivate or maintain a reputation in other 
genres with more commercial potential. Or, a copyright owner may 
temporally stagger releases of a work (“windowing”)26 to price 
discriminate against consumers willing to pay for early access. In 
these and other circumstances, restricting the dissemination of 
works can be consistent with the copyright’s utilitarian incentive-
based rationale. 
Of course, some copyright creators do not care about financial 
payoffs or seek to maximize their returns on investment.27 
Copyright owners assert their copyright interests for non-financial 
	
AND THEIR LEGACY 13 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011). This 
Article considers only U.S. law and does not address the complexities raised by foreign moral 
rights schemes. 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24.  See, e.g., PolyGram Holding, Inc. (Three Tenors), 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003), aff’d, 416 F.3d 
29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (copyright owners sought to restrict sales of existing works because they 
feared such sales would reduce demand for a newly released work); see also Eric Schlachter, 
The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on 
the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15 (1997). 
 25.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-806, COLLEGE TEXTBOOKS: 
ENHANCED OFFERINGS APPEAR TO DRIVE RECENT PRICE INCREASES (2005). 
 26.  E.g., Schruers, supra note 2. 
 27.  See SILBEY, EUREKA MYTH, supra note 3 (establishing this empirically across  
creative fields). 
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reasons as well.28 Copyright owners may do so by refusing to 
license the works for new contexts or derivative purposes because 
they want to control all versions of their work—for example, 
sequels, abridgments or spin-offs.29 Copyright owners may also 
decide to completely withdraw their work from the public sphere. 
These alternative motivations can create friction for copyright 
doctrines predicated on utilitarian justifications.30 However, they fit 
more comfortably within other theories that justify copyright 
protection, such as the Lockean/”natural rights” theory that people 
should be rewarded for their labor31 or the Kantian “personhood” 
theory that authors should control work that is an extension of their 
personality. This Part focuses on copyright’s utilitarian 
justification. Part IV relaxes that assumption. 
When copyright is properly understood as an intermediary 
benefit for authors and owners in exchange for society receiving 
those works as a contribution to the “progress of science,” privacy 
claims that suppress the work violate copyright’s quid pro quo. 
Indeed, privileging privacy over dissemination reverses the 
hierarchy of copyright’s beneficiaries, putting the author or 
copyright owner above the social welfare of “progress” that the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause contemplates as the 
ultimate goal. As a creature of positive law, and not as a natural 
right, copyright functions as an incentive to create and disseminate 
expressive works. The incentive may be easily misunderstood as 
creating a natural right to one’s expression equal to society’s 
interests in accumulating knowledge, especially as copyright has 
expanded over decades to be longer and stronger than in the past.32 
But copyright’s quid pro quo does not work that way. Rights are 
granted with the expectation that the expression protected will 
contribute to the common weal. 
	
 28.  See, e.g., id. at 218–25. 
 29.  See Deidré A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A Case 
Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511 (2012). 
 30.  Fromer, supra note 3. 
 31.  See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–44 (1993). 
 32.  Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587 (2008) (explaining 
how copyright’s exclusive rights have been expanding while fair use’s “footprint” has 
remained static). 
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C. Memory Holes Without Copyright 
Because every Internet-posted work has the potential to reach a 
global audience, people regularly seek legal tools that give them 
control of content about them. 
The European Union’s “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) is one 
such tool. RTBF allows individuals to remove search engine links 
to irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise objectionable information 
about them, unless there is sufficient countervailing public 
interest.33 For example, a person can request that Google remove 
links to personal information about the person’s finances (such as a 
bankruptcy) that was published in a newspaper.34 The original 
newspaper publication is not erased—RTBF is not a comprehensive 
memory hole—but the material is “obscured” by becoming harder 
to find.35 
RTBF is hugely popular. As of December 12, 2018, Google had 
received over 750,000 removal requests covering nearly three 
million URLs.36 And, the RTBF concept is expanding to jurisdictions 
beyond Europe.37 
In contrast to RTBF and other international content suppression 
doctrines, United States law heavily restricts erasing or removing 
content both constitutionally and statutorily. The First Amendment 
prohibits state or federal governments from “abridging the 
freedom of speech,”38 which significantly limits legally compelled 
suppression for most types of speech. The First Amendment’s 
speech and press freedoms further protect publishers’ editorial 
	
 33.  Because the content remains on the original publisher’s site and only the search 
engine links are removed, the “forgotten” reference is a misnomer. It might be more 
accurately characterized as a right to make the content harder to find or to obscure the 
content. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think About Your 
Data Than ‘Privacy’, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/. 
 34.  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317. 
 35.  Julie Cohen describes the possibility of producing obscurity through semantic 
discontinuity. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE 
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 223–66 (2012). 
 36.  Requests to Delist Content Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 37.  Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES  
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/technology/personaltech/right-to-
be-forgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html. 
 38.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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discretion (what they choose to publish) by severely limiting prior 
restraints of speech,39 such as pre-publication content suppression. 
As a result, except with respect to a few specific classes of 
unprotected speech (such as obscenity, child pornography, 
incitements to imminent violence, etc.), most laws that restrict 
dissemination on the basis of their content are subject to the highest 
level of constitutional protection (“strict scrutiny”) and are 
presumptively invalid.40 
Legislatures have the authority to supplement the First 
Amendment’s baseline protection with additional speech-
enhancing statutory provisions, and legislatures frequently do so. 
For example, about 30 states41 have enacted “anti-SLAPP” laws—
”strategic lawsuits against public participation”—aimed at 
prohibiting abusive lawsuits designed to suppress socially 
beneficial speech.42 If a lawsuit qualifies as a SLAPP, the anti-
SLAPP law usually provides for procedural “fast lanes” to end the 
lawsuit quickly and award attorneys’ fees to the defendant.43 
Content suppression lawsuits may be considered SLAPPs. 
Congress also enacted a significant free speech-enhancing 
statute in 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 immunizes 
online publishers for tort liability (including privacy and 
reputational claims) attributable to content that originates from 
third parties. Due to Section 230, online publishers cannot be 
compelled to suppress third-party content—even if they receive 
takedown notices or demand letters targeting the content,44 they 
	
 39.  E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex 
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
 40.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (content-based restrictions  
are subject to strict scrutiny); Near, 283 U.S. at 723 (previous restraints are  
presumptively unconstitutional). 
 41.  Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/s/Anti-
SLAPP_State_Table-10_24_17.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 42.  GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING  
OUT (1996). 
 43.  Eric Goldman, 59 Legal Scholars Sign Letter Supporting SPEAK FREE Act to Create 
Federal Anti-SLAPP Law, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 17, 2015), https://blog. 
ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/09/59-legal-scholars-sign-letter-supporting-speak-free-
act-to-create-federal-anti-slapp-law-forbes-cross-post.htm. 
 44.  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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“know” that the targeted content violates the law,45 and (perhaps 
most surprisingly) a court orders the content’s removal.46 
Because of Section 230’s powerful protections for free speech, 
most legal demands for removal of online third-party content are 
not successful. Most apropos to this Article, Section 230 means that 
online publishers, virtually without exception, are not liable for 
privacy violations or reputational injuries attributable to content 
provided by third parties and are not obligated to remove content 
in response to complaints or legal threats.47 This makes a European-
style RTBF currently impossible in the United States; it would 
conflict with both the First Amendment and Section 230.48 
Section 230 has several statutory exceptions, including an 
exclusion for intellectual property (discussed below). In the last few 
years, plaintiffs have also found some common law gaps in Section 
230’s immunity.49 However, for the most part, Section 230’s broad 
immunity rule for online hosts and publishers remains a significant 
enabler of Internet speech and a limitation on redressing privacy 
and reputational concerns online. 
Thus, the difficult-to-penetrate shield of the First Amendment, 
supplemented by statutory protections, drives people seeking 
content suppression to explore other legal options. This creates a 
balloon-squeezing dynamic: as the primary legal tools that protect 
privacy and reputation appear unavailable or weak, plaintiffs’ 
demand for legal redress gets pushed toward the edges of legal 
options, such as copyright law.50 
	
 45.  E.g., People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE019224, 2016 WL 7237305 (Cal. Super. Ct.  
Dec. 9, 2016). 
 46.  E.g., Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 47.  ERIC GOLDMAN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 346–49 (2018). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Eric Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five Best), TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/01/ten-
worst-section-230-rulings-of-2016-plus-the-five-best.htm. 
 50.  McKeown, supra note 5, at 1 (describing “the growing number of claims that 
invoke copyright protection to remedy a broad array of personal harms—such as invasion 
of privacy—and in the process tromp on the First Amendment”). 
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D. Copyright’s Appeal as a Memory Hole 
Copyright is an attractive tool for suppressing Internet content 
and public discourse for five reasons.51 
First, the First Amendment is already (nominally) 
accommodated in the copyright statute. The Supreme Court has 
said that copyright doctrine incorporates First Amendment 
concerns through the idea/expression dichotomy, which says 
copyright protects only expression of facts and ideas but not the 
facts and ideas themselves, and the fair use doctrine, which excuses 
secondary uses of copyrighted works to enable other specified 
expressive activities deemed socially beneficial, such as education, 
news reporting, and critique.52 
Accordingly, there is no independent First Amendment defense 
to a copyright infringement claim. If a copyright owner has a valid 
copyright claim, the lawsuit does not conflict with First 
Amendment doctrines. So when copyright owners use copyright 
law to advance privacy or reputation concerns, they bypass the 
typical First Amendment limits on privacy and reputation claims.53 
Second, Section 230 contains a statutory exclusion for 
“intellectual property” claims, including federal copyright claims.54 
Section 230 does not protect online publishers from liability for 
other people’s intellectual property infringement. Indeed, 
copyright law is filled with cases where online services have been 
held liable for, and gone out of business due to, user-directed 
	
 51.  See id. at 11–16; see also John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245, 
262–66 (2015) (comparing copyright claims to right of publicity and trademark claims). 
Professor Keller suggests another reason: that federal copyright law is uniform across the 
country, rather than the state-by-state variations for the privacy and reputation torts. Deidré 
A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH.  
1 (2016). 
 52.  Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (ideas and concepts are not protected); id. § 107 (deeming uses 
of works for the purposes of teaching, news reporting, comment, and criticism fair uses, and 
reciting a four factor test). 
 53.  See infra Part III; see also Keller, supra note 51. 
 54.  In the Ninth Circuit, Section 230 may nevertheless immunize state copyright law 
claims. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Eric Goldman, The 
Defend Trade Secrets Act Isn’t an “Intellectual Property” Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 
541 (2017) (explaining the interaction between state IP laws and Section 230). Compare with 
17 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018) (federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings are excluded 
from Section 230’s immunity). This minor exception is immaterial to our analysis. 
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copyright infringements.55 By asserting a copyright claim, the 
copyright owners avoid Section 230’s immunity.56 
Third, in 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).  One of the DMCA’s provisions partially 
backfills Section 230’s lack of immunity for online publishers from 
liability for third party copyright infringements. The DMCA 
provides a safe harbor for online publishers from liability for third 
party content so long as the publishers expeditiously remove 
allegedly infringing items upon the copyright owner’s request (a 
provision frequently called “notice-and-takedown”).57 The 
DMCA’s notice-and-takedown approach can help copyright 
owners suppress allegedly infringing content simply by asking.58 
Online publishers who receive a copyright takedown notice 
have the legal right to forego the DMCA’s safe harbor by ignoring 
the notice. Few online publishers choose this option. Without the 
DMCA’s safe harbor protection, the publisher faces uncertain 
liability and potentially ruinous financial outcomes. 
Thus, the DMCA sets up carrot-and-stick incentives that push 
online publishers towards over-suppression: removing content in 
response to takedown notices preserves their eligibility for the safe 
harbor, while ignoring takedown notices potentially leads to dire 
consequences. The result has been a tsunami of copyright 
takedown notices,59 many of which are not motivated by copyright 
	
 55.  E.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); EMI Christian Music 
Grp., Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); cf. UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (Veoh, a video 
hosting site, was bankrupted by the lawsuit that confirmed its eligibility for the DMCA  
safe harbor). 
 56.  E.g., Bambauer, supra note 4, at 2055 (viewing Section 230’s limitation as a benefit 
of expanding copyright liability). 
 57.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (d). 
 58.  Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and 
Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 371 (2017); Jennifer 
M. Urban, et al., Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
483 (2017). 
 59.  For example, Google alone has received requests to remove nearly four billion 
URLs as of December 2018. Requests to Delist Content Due to Copyright, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
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concerns.60 Unless the online publisher has some extra incentive to 
defend the third party’s uploaded work, the DMCA takedown 
notices typically lead to removal of the targeted work, even if the 
publication is not copyright infringing.61 
Fourth, copyright infringement is a strict liability offense.62 
Plaintiffs do not have to show intent or knowledge of wrongdoing 
on the part of the alleged infringer. Copyright plaintiffs avoid the 
First Amendment scienter requirements for privacy and reputation 
laws, such as the actual malice requirement for some defamation 
claims.63 Without any scienter requirements, copyright claims are 
easier, and may be cheaper, to win than analogous privacy or 
reputation tort claims.64 
Fifth, copyright law provides powerful remedies.65 In some 
circumstances, copyright owners can obtain attorney’s fees and 
statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work,66 irrespective of the 
actual harm suffered by the copyright owner.67 Among other 
benefits, the statutory damages do not have minimum scienter 
prerequisites, unlike some defamation damages.68 
	
 60.  Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006). 
 61.  E.g., Tehranian, supra note 51, at 273–76. 
 62.  E.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663, 678 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); 
Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Gener-Villar v. 
Adcom Grp., Inc, 509 F. Supp 2d 117, 124 (D.P.R. 2007) (“[T]he Copyright Act is a strict 
liability regime under which any infringer, whether innocent or intentional, is liable.”); King 
Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F. Supp. 2d 812, 852 (M.D. Tenn. 2006); Educ. Testing Serv. v. 
Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). But see Patrick R. Goold, Is 
Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305 (2015) (arguing that 
copyright is a fault-based tort doctrine). 
 63.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (recovery for defamation of a 
private figure requires actual malice when matter is a public concern); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recovery for defamation of a public figure requires  
actual malice). 
 64.  Cf. Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019) (discussing how Section 230’s statutory protection has 
procedural and financial benefits over First Amendment litigation, even if the legal 
conclusions were the same). 
 65.  Keller, supra note 51. 
 66.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018). 
 67.  Id. § 505. 
 68.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–50; Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1492 (2014). Copyright statutory damages may be awarded in higher 
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Copyright law also provides for equitable relief, including 
injunctions against continued dissemination,69 which courts 
routinely grant.70 Because copyright-based injunctions are not 
subjected to First Amendment scrutiny, copyright may effectuate 
“prior restraints” that would be nearly impossible when alleging 
either a pure First Amendment claim or claims with explicit First 
Amendment exemptions.71 
Thus, copyright owners can obtain remedies that are not 
available to plaintiffs asserting typical privacy or reputation law 
claims—including, most crucially, injunctions that send content to 
the memory hole. The framers of the Constitution and the Congress 
that enacted the first Copyright Act in 1790 intended copyright to 
be an engine of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and of 
the press.72 They did not intend copyright law to enable memory 
holes.73 Even so, copyright law has evolved remarkably well for 
that purpose.74   
	
amounts if the defendant engaged in willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). However, a 
court can still award statutory damages even if the defendant unintentionally infringed. Id. 
 69.  17 U.S.C. § 502. 
 70.  Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 215, 222 (2012). 
 71.  See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 173–74 (1998); McKeown, supra note 5, at 5 (“I 
refer to the use of copyright injunctions to impose what amounts to prior restraints  
on offensive, unpopular or sensitive speech. These kinds of cases look, feel and smell like  
the real First Amendment cases. They are fundamentally about censorship of  
unpopular speech.”). 
 72.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also 
McKeown, supra note 5, at 1 (“[C]opyright and the First Amendment are both in tension and 
in synergy with each other.”). 
 73.  Ironically, copyright’s origin in the Stationer’s guild in England was to suppress 
speech critical of the Crown. Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the 
Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 914 (2002). This law 
evolved into the Statute of Anne in Britain and the Copyright Act in the United States, both 
of which sought to promote expression rather than control it. Id. at 914, 929; cf. Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing early 
“censorial” roots by authors in copyright law). 
 74.  Cf. Tehranian, supra note 51, at 251 (“[W]ould-be censors have converted losing 
tort claims, such as defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (immunized, as they are, by the First Amendment), into viable  
copyright infringement claims that punish their foes for legitimate speech-related activity.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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III. HOW COPYRIGHT OWNERS EFFECTUATE MEMORY HOLES 
This Part describes three legal strategies that copyright owners 
have pursued to suppress unwanted content for reasons unrelated 
to copyright law’s purpose. As the cases illustrate, plaintiffs 
struggle to succeed on the merits of their copyright claims when 
deploying these techniques. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ attempts cause substantial content 
suppression for two reasons. First, many defendants remove 
content upon demand rather than defend their positions in court. 
As a result, merely by asserting the positions discussed in this Part, 
copyright owners may effectively suppress content without any 
judicial oversight. Second, when plaintiffs succeed with any one of 
these positions, they establish a template that others may follow. 
Part V will discuss ways to prevent both of these threats of content 
suppression. This Part taxonomizes the positions to better 
understand their mechanisms and flaws. 
A. Acquisition Before Creation: The Case of Medical Justice 
A person or business can seek to obtain copyright ownership 
over works that have not been created yet. We call this “pre-
creation acquisitions.”  
Most pre-creation acquisitions are typical copyright 
transactions that are part of the ordinary process of creating and 
disseminating copyrighted works. For example, companies 
routinely retain contractors to perform services and prospectively 
obtain copyright ownership over the materials produced by the 
contractors.75 This quid pro quo—payment in exchange for new 
works—advances copyright’s goals by encouraging the production 
of new socially valuable works that the hiring party uses to grow 
its company’s enterprise. We are not concerned with these typical 
copyright transactions. 
	
 75.  A hiring party can obtain copyright ownership from third parties via contractual 
assignment or as a “work made for hire.” 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). The primary copyright law 
distinction between the two mechanisms is that assigned works are subject to a non-waivable 
“termination of transfer” after thirty-five to forty years when the owner can take back 
ownership of the work. Id. § 203. Works made for hire are not subject to that termination of 
transfer. Id. § 203(a). This distinction isn’t material to this Article’s analysis, so we do not 
distinguish between ownership acquired via assignment and works made for hire. 
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In contrast, other types of pre-creation acquisitions can clearly 
undermine copyright’s goals of incentivizing creation and 
dissemination. Consider the example of suppressing online 
reviews of service providers through pre-creation acquisition. 
In the 2000s, online review of healthcare providers became 
more prevalent. This concerned healthcare providers in part 
because they felt like the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limited their ability to rebut 
patient reviews.76 In response to this perceived limitation, an 
organization called Medical Justice offered a form contract that 
healthcare providers could adopt; the form required patients to 
assign copyright in any as-of-yet unwritten reviews of their 
healthcare provider.77 The healthcare provider could then assert its 
acquired copyright interest in those reviews to remove any 
unwanted reviews from the Internet—effectuating copyright’s 
memory hole.78 
Without Medical Justice’s workaround, Section 230 would 
protect review websites from any healthcare provider’s demands 
to remove unwanted patient reviews.79 However, by allowing 
healthcare providers to frame their demands as copyright 
infringement claims, the demands fall outside Section 230’s 
immunity, which expressly excludes intellectual property claims. 
Instead, the healthcare provider’s copyright demands implicate  
the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown scheme. Review websites  
would have to either accede to the healthcare provider’s  
	
 76.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936. 
 77.  The Back Story, DOCTORED REVIEWS, https://www.doctoredreviews.com/ 
patients/the-back-story/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 78.  The contract was named a “Mutual Agreement to Maintain Privacy,” but because 
HIPAA already required that healthcare providers maintain their patients’ privacy, any 
promise by the provider to maintain patient privacy was illusory. Myths: True or False: A 
Closer Look at Some of Medical Justice’s Key Claims, DOCTORED REVIEWS, 
https://www.doctoredreviews.com/medical-justice-myths/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 79.  E.g., Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., No. 155629/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013) (dentist’s 
failed lawsuit against Yelp over patient’s review); Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2010) (doctor’s failed lawsuit against Yelp over patient’s review); see also Hassell  
v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (court cannot compel Yelp to remove defamatory review  
of attorney). 
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copyright takedown demands or forego their valuable DMCA safe 
harbor protection.80 
A combination of industry pressure, adverse litigation, 
government regulation, and legislative reform doomed Medical 
Justice’s purported copyright workaround. The Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights issued an 
opinion that doctors could not implement these copyright-from-
patient transfers.81 Few healthcare providers asserted the contract 
in court, but when they did the assertions were met with judicial 
skepticism.82 Several review websites independently decided not to 
honor the DMCA takedown notices predicated on Medical Justice’s 
contract, signaling that they would be willing to forego the 
DMCA’s safe harbors to protect their consumers’ free speech 
rights.83 And the Federal Trade Commission received a complaint 
that Medical Justice was falsely advertising the efficacy of its 
contracts in light of these roadblocks.84 In response to these 
developments, Medical Justice decided to “retire” its contracts,  
and it advised its healthcare-provider customers to stop using  
its forms.85 
In 2016, Congress enacted the Consumer Review Fairness Act 
(CRFA),86 which partially redresses the problems exposed by 
	
 80.  The review sites would be responding to the doctors’ demands, not patients who 
have changed their minds. 
 81.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Private Practice Ceases Conditioning of 
Compliance with the Privacy Rule, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/all-cases/index.html#case29 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 82.  E.g., Lee v. Makhnevich, No. 11 Civ. 8665(PAC), 2013 WL 1234829 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
27, 2013). 
 83.  Eric Goldman, Top Internet Law Developments of 2011, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG 
(Jan. 27, 2012), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/top_internet_la.htm. 
 84.  Complaint, Medical Justice Corp., filed before the Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/20111129_medjustice_complaint.pdf; see also Justin Brookman, 
CDT Files FTC Complaint Against Medical Justice, CDT: BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011), 
https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-files-ftc-complaint-against-medical-justice/. 
 85.  Eric Goldman, Medical Justice Capitulates by “Retiring” Its Anti-Patient Review 
Contracts, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/ 
archives/2011/12/medical_justice.htm. 
 86.  Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 45b (2018)). See generally Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer 
Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (explaining the 
CRFA). California had previously enacted similar pro-consumer review legislation in 2014. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8 (West Supp. 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). However, unlike the CRFA, 
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Medical Justice’s technique. The CRFA expressly prohibits 
businesses from using form contracts that “transfer[] or require[] an 
individual who is a party to the form contract to transfer to  
any person any intellectual property rights in review or  
feedback content.”87 The CRFA makes any ongoing deployment of 
Medical Justice’s form contracts, or any copycat efforts, ineffectual 
and unlawful. 
However, the CRFA does not eliminate the potential for pre-
creation copyright acquisitions to suppress consumer reviews or 
other types of content. First, the CRFA only applies to “form 
contracts.”88 Businesses could individually negotiate contracts with 
consumers to achieve the same outcome. Second, the CRFA does 
not apply to restrictions on “unlawful” content,89 which might 
include defamatory reviews that are otherwise protected by Section 
230 and the First Amendment. This means that prospective 
copyright assignments could target defamatory reviews for 
suppression, avoiding hard-to-win defamation law to achieve the 
same end.90 Third, the CRFA does not prevent contractual limits 
based on trade secrets or confidentiality.91 Finally, the CRFA only 
applies to “a written, oral, or pictorial review, performance 
assessment of, or other similar analysis of, including by electronic 
means, the goods, services, or conduct of a person.”92 There are 
many other types of content that may be targeted for pre-creation 
acquisition beyond this statutory scope. As such, although Medical 
Justice’s copyright workaround failed and the CRFA banned any 
efforts to redeploy it, many situations remain where pre-creation 
copyright acquisition could be deployed to facilitate memory holes. 
	
the California law does not expressly address prospective copyright assignments and may 
not apply to them. 
 87.  Consumer Review Fairness Act § 2(b)(1)(C). 
 88.  Id. § 2(b)(1). 
 89.  Id. § 2(b)(3)(D). 
 90.  Goldman, supra note 85. 
 91.  Consumer Review Fairness Act § 2(b)(3)(A); see Eric Goldman, Businesses Cannot 
Contractually Ban “Abusive” Consumer Reviews, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 17, 2018), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/07/businesses-cannot-contractually-ban-
abusive-consumer-reviews.htm. 
 92.  Consumer Review Fairness Act § 2(a)(2). 
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B. Post-Publication Acquisition Through Transfer 
After content has been published, a person can try to suppress 
it by acquiring and then asserting ownership of the content’s 
copyright. Three cases from the Internet era illustrate different 
ways that people have tried to deploy this technique.93 
1. Scott v. WorldStarHipHop94  
A student recorded a classroom brawl on his phone between 
Mr. Scott (a student) and his current and former girlfriends and 
then posted the recording to WorldStarHipHop, a user-generated 
content video site similar to YouTube. The title of the posting was 
“Disgraceful: College fight in NYC Breaks Out Between A Guy, His 
Girl and Another Girl in Class! (Man Strong Arm’s [sic] The 
Student. Hitting Her with Body Shots).”95 
Unhappy about the video’s publication, Scott acquired the 
video’s copyright from his classmate and demanded that 
WorldStarHipHop remove the video. WorldStarHipHop refused, 
likely foreclosing any DMCA safe harbor it might have claimed. 
Scott sued WorldStarHipHop for copyright infringement, privacy 
violations, publicity rights violations, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. Two years into the case, the court dismissed the 
privacy and other non-copyright claims.96 
The copyright claim persisted for two more years, going 
through several rounds of procedural and substantive motions. 
Four years after first filing suit, the parties settled the copyright 
	
 93.  These cases reflect the digital age, but there are similar cases from the pre-Internet 
era, such as Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), where 
Howard Hughes acquired the copyright in a magazine article about himself to control its 
reuse in an unauthorized biography. 
 94.  Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538(PKC)(RLE), 2012 WL 5835232 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012); Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538(PKC)(RLE),  2012 
WL 1592229 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012); Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538 PKC, 
2011 WL 13079877 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011); see also Eric Goldman, The Dangerous Meme That 
Won’t Go Away: Using Copyright Assignments to Suppress Unwanted Content—Scott v. 
WorldStarHipHop, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 14, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2012/05/the_meme_that_w.htm. 
 95.  Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538(PKC)(RLE),  2012 WL 1592229 
(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012). 
 96.  Id. 
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claims on confidential terms.97 The two additional years of litigation 
demonstrate the extra costs borne by the defendant specifically due 
to the copyright claims compared to the parallel privacy and 
reputation claims. 
2. Katz v. Chevaldina98  
Katz is a Florida real estate magnate and part-owner of the 
Miami Heat professional basketball team. One of his tenants, 
Chevaldina, published a blog post that criticized Katz’s  
business practices. Chevaldina’s post included a photo she  
copied and pasted from a newspaper website. The photo shows 
Katz with his tongue hanging out of the side of his mouth.99 Katz 
acquired the photo’s copyright and then sued Chevaldina for 
copyright infringement. 
After nearly four years of litigation, the district court ruled,100 
and the appeals court affirmed,101 that Chevaldina’s publication of 
the photo constituted fair use and awarded Chevaldina over 
$150,000 of attorneys’ fees pursuant to copyright’s fee-shifting 
provision.102 As part of its fair use analysis, the appeals court 
highlighted the photo’s noncommercial and educational fair uses, 
that is, to criticize Katz’s business practices. 
The appeals court also explained that Chevaldina’s critical use 
would not diminish the market value of the photo. Katz did not 
	
 97.  Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
09538 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 28, 2014), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=2867&context=historical. 
 98.  Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015); Katz v. Chevaldina, 111 U.S.P.Q. 
2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2012); see also Eric 
Goldman, You Can’t Buy a Copyright, Just to Bury It, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2015, 11:59 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/09/21/you-cant-buy-a-copyright-just-
to-bury-it/. 
 99.   
As the appeals court remarked, Katz’s “tongue protrudes askew from his mouth.” Katz v. 
Google, 802 F.3d at 1180. 
 100.  Katz v. Chevaldina, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
 101.  Katz v. Google, 802 F.3d at 1180. 
 102.  For copyright’s fee-shifting provision, see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2018). 
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acquire the photo’s copyright to make money from its 
dissemination, but rather to suppress its publication. 
Chevaldina’s use of the Photo would not materially impair 
Katz’s incentive to publish the work. Katz took the highly unusual 
step of obtaining the copyright to the Photo and initiating this 
lawsuit specifically to prevent its publication. Katz profoundly 
distastes the Photo and seeks to extinguish, for all time, the 
dissemination of his “embarrassing” countenance. Due to Katz’s 
attempt to utilize copyright as an instrument of censorship against 
unwanted criticism, there is no potential market for his work.103 
In Katz and WorldStarHipHop, both plaintiffs sought to 
permanently suppress embarrassing online content of which they 
are the subject, not the author. However, the cases differ in two 
important ways. 
First, Katz was a public figure. He was sufficiently well-known 
to be the subject of news before Chevaldina wrote about him. As a 
result, compared to private figure Scott, Katz may have had 
diminished privacy expectations, and his visibility strengthened 
the argument in favor of Chevaldina’s fair use. 
Second, the uploader in WorldStarHipHop granted the online 
service copyright permission to publish the video before Scott 
acquired the copyright, whereas Chevaldina never had 
authorization to use the Katz photo because she copied it from the 
Internet. As a result, in Katz, the photographer (or his copyright 
assignee) who originally published the Katz photo could have sued 
for Chevaldina’s subsequent and unauthorized use of the photo on 
her blog. This difference seemingly tilts in favor of Katz, as in 
theory he assumed the photographer’s existing right to sue 
Chevaldina. However, the copyright transfer from the 
photographer to Katz materially changed the reasons for the 
copyright enforcement. The original photo publisher might have 
sought to protect the photo’s licensing potential and the 
photographer’s authorial interests in the photography. In contrast, 
Katz used the copyright to permanently suppress embarrassing but 
true content from the Internet that he had no role in generating or 
interest in publishing.  
	
 103.  Katz v. Google, 802 F.3d at 1184. 
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3. Small Justice v. Xcentric104  
Small Justice involves the website Ripoff Report, which allows 
users to post negative reviews of businesses. Ripoff Report differs 
from most other user-generated content websites in three ways that 
are material here. First, Ripoff Report requires authors to grant the 
site an irrevocable and partially exclusive license to their 
submissions. This makes Ripoff Report a partial copyright owner 
of the submissions.105 Second, Ripoff Report does not provide 
authors with any contractual or operational right to edit or delete 
their content once submitted (unlike the WorldStarHipHop 
service). Third, Ripoff Report has a policy that it will not remove 
user submissions once published, even in the face of legal threats.106 
A pseudonymous author published a negative review of the 
Small Justice law firm on Ripoff Report, alleging improper personal 
and professional conduct by the law firm.107 The law firm acquired 
the copyright to the published review, purported to terminate the 
copyright license to Ripoff Report, and when Ripoff Report did not 
remove the review, sued Ripoff Report for copyright infringement. 
What makes this case unusual is how Small Justice purportedly 
acquired copyright ownership of the content it sought to  
suppress. Because the review author was pseudonymous, Small 
Justice could not directly negotiate an acquisition of the  
	
 104.  Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017); Small 
Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190 (D. Mass. 2015); Small Justice LLC 
v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 13-CV-11701, 2014 WL 1214828 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2014); see 
also Eric Goldman, First Circuit Rejects Copyright Workaround to Section 230—Small Justice v. 
Ripoff Report, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2017), https://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2017/10/first-circuit-rejects-copyright-workaround-to-section-230-small-
justice-v-ripoff-report.htm; Eric Goldman, The Latest Insidious Tactic to Scrub Online Consumer 
Reviews, FORBES (July 23, 2013, 12:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/ 
2013/07/23/the-latest-insidious-tactic-to-scrub-online-consumer-reviews. 
 105.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” to include an 
assignment or exclusive license “of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised 
in a copyright,” but expressly excluding nonexclusive licenses). 
 106.  Terms of Service, RIPOFF REPORT, https://www.ripoffreport.com/terms-of-service 
(last updated May 2, 2019) (“Ripoff Report is intended to be a permanent record of disputes, 
including disputes which have been fully resolved. In order to maintain a complete record, 
information posted on Ripoff Report, subject to the Terms outlined herein, will not be 
removed. By posting information on Ripoff Report, you understand and agree that the 
material you post will become part of Ripoff Report’s permanent record and will NOT be 
removed even at your request.”). 
 107.  The law firm’s principal is Richard Goren. For simplicity, we treat Goren and Small 
Justice as a single plaintiff. 
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copyright. Instead, Small Justice sued the pseudonymous author in 
state court for libel and intentional interference with prospective 
contractual relations (reinforcing that, like the other cases in this 
Part, privacy/reputation concerns drove the speech-suppression 
strategy). When the author failed to appear in the state case, Small 
Justice obtained a default judgment against the author. 
As a remedy for the default judgment, Small Justice convinced 
the state court to award it the author’s copyright to the negative 
review. Armed with copyright ownership, Small Justice demanded 
that Ripoff Report erase the post or face copyright infringement 
liability. Neither Small Justice nor the original review author had 
the technical capacity to delete the post from the site. As a result, 
Ripoff Report’s anti-removal policy virtually necessitated court 
intervention for Small Justice to suppress the review. 
Small Justice eventually lost the suit in federal court and could 
not compel suppression of the negative review about the law 
firm.108 Nonetheless, this case highlights numerous problems with 
post-publication copyright acquisition and enforcement that are 
likely to repeat often. 
First, state courts almost never see federal copyright cases 
(because federal courts have original jurisdiction over federal 
copyright cases),109 so the Small Justice state court’s mistaken 
transfer of the copyright110 is not that surprising—especially on a 
default judgment when the defendant is not around to point out the 
court’s error. 
Second, most online services take only nonexclusive licenses 
that can be canceled by the user (usually by logging into the account 
and deleting the content). When the online service has only a 
nonpermanent and nonexclusive license, the copyright owner—
even if it acquires the copyright post-publication—may have the 
legal grounds to terminate the license with the online service and 
expose it to copyright infringement risk. Ripoff Report is relatively 
unusual in that it attempts to take a permanent ownership stake in 
user submissions. 
	
 108.  Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 109.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2018). 
 110.  17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2018) (“[N]o action by any governmental body or other official 
or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership 
with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given 
effect under this title . . . .”). 
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Third, pseudonymous and anonymous authors present service 
of process issues. It is not surprising that the pseudonymous author 
of the Small Justice negative review did not appear in court111 
because there is a good chance he or she was not properly identified 
or served. In cases involving pseudonymous or anonymous 
authors who do not appear to contest lawsuits against them, judges 
do not benefit from the adversarial error correction on which our 
adjudication system is predicated. 
Fourth, default judgments create other abuse possibilities. 
Professor Eugene Volokh has documented dozens of times that 
plaintiffs obtained or forged illegitimate default judgments to get 
court-ordered content removals.112 To increase the odds of winning 
these court orders, a plaintiff can intentionally sue the wrong 
defendant (especially when the author is pseudonymous) to ensure 
that no defendant appears to contest the lawsuit. Or, a plaintiff can 
sue defendants who would be embarrassed or harmed by having 
the content publicly attributed to them.113 Either way, the resulting 
court orders are fundamentally invalid and can cause substantial 
mischief. But no one may be willing or procedurally capable to 
challenge the defective orders. 
Fifth, most online content authors will not stand behind their 
content when someone makes legal threats over it. They prefer 
settlement to fighting back. This makes settlement particularly 
attractive if all that is required is a copyright assignment, which has 
little or no inherent financial or personal value to the author.114  
	
 111.  Cf. Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (raising questions about the legitimacy 
of service of process for a pseudonymous author). 
 112.  Revised Amicus Curiae Brief of Eugene Volokh in Support of Appellant, Hassell v. 
Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (No. S235968), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=historical; see also Paul Alan Levy, Multiple Fake 
Consent Orders in Baltimore—Will Judges Remedy Their Own Prior Restraints Procured by Fraud?, 
PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 12, 2017), https://pubcit.typepad. 
com/clpblog/2017/05/multiple-fake-consent-orders-in-baltimore-will-judges-remedy-
their-own-prior-restraints-procured-by-.html; Manhattan Businessman Sentenced to Nine 
Months in Prison for Forging Federal Court Orders to Remove Negative Reviews from Internet 
Search Results, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/manhattan-businessman-sentenced-nine-months-prison-forging-federal-court-
orders-remove. 
 113.  Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 351 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C.  2018) (discussing how 
a copyright troll deliberately takes advantage of the defendants’ potential embarrassment to 
extract settlements). 
 114.  In this respect, efforts to create copyright memory holes may resemble and take 
advantage of the practice of copyright trolling. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy 
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The threaten-and-settle technique makes it easy—perhaps too 
easy—for people unhappy with copyrighted works to take 
possession of the copyright and weaponize it to proliferate 
copyright’s memory holes. 
Despite suppression efforts often failing, for the reasons 
discussed in this section, post-publication suppression efforts are 
costly and present a clear danger of persistent information 
distortion. Copyright law can be easily abused by plaintiffs because 
of the federal law’s complexity, the likelihood of default judgments, 
and the cost and nuisance of litigation. These case outcomes may 
seem like common sense to most lawyers, but the proliferation of 
these cases, their time to resolution, and the basic procedural 
maneuvers on which they are based, raise real concerns about 
copyright law’s ongoing and persistent use as a suppression tool. 
C. Acquisition Through Depiction 
A third way a person may suppress a copyrighted work that 
depicts them is by claiming to own the copyright by authoring the 
work. We call this authorship-through-depiction. 
Some authorship-through-depiction ownership situations are 
ordinary and appropriate. If the depicted person superintended the 
work, controlled its arrangement and production, and authorized 
fixation of the work, it would be expected and reasonable for the 
person to own the copyright.115 For example, musicians or dancers 
may own copyrights in their live performances if they make a 
simultaneous recording of the performance.116 
In contrast, we are concerned when depicted people claim to 
author their performances simply by being depicted and then assert 
the performance copyright to control the recordings depicting 
them. These mutant authorship-through-depiction claims can turn 
copyright on its head, stripping control of the work from the 
	
Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (2013); Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, 
an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (2015). 
 115.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884); Lindsay v. The 
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248(HB), 1999 WL 816163 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999). 
 116.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “fixed” works). 
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intended copyright owner and giving that control to the depicted 
person (or persons), who can use it to suppress the work.117 
Consider how an authorship-through-depiction argument may 
have appeared in the WorldStarHipHop situation discussed above. 
Scott, the fist-fighting boyfriend caught on video, could assert that 
he had a copyright in his fighting movements, so publishing a video 
depicting the brawl infringed copyright in those movements. This 
would give him control over the video’s publication without the 
cost or other hassles of post-creation acquisition from the 
videographer. As we have already seen, even if the pugilist’s 
copyright claim is dubious, a colorable argument can be 
weaponized for years. 
Based on black-letter copyright law, these arguments for 
copyright authorship and ownership through depiction should fail. 
First, copyright only protects “original works of authorship,”118 and 
it is unlikely a spontaneous sequence of fighting movements would 
satisfy this standard.119 Second, federal copyright law only protects 
“fixed” works that are recorded in a tangible medium.120 Video-
recording would ordinarily qualify as a fixation method. However, 
to properly fix a recording requires that it was made “by or under 
the authority of the author.”121 Scott, making an authorship-like 
claim over a fixed work, cannot legitimately assert that his 
classmate’s independent video-recording of the fight was made 
under his authority. As such, Scott cannot claim copyright in the 
recording. He never fixed his fighting moves, so federal copyright 
	
 117.  More frequently, people can control their images through right of publicity, which 
has direct roots in privacy law but has evolved over the twentieth century to overlap with 
both copyright and trademark law. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: 
PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018). For discussions of photographic subjects 
asserting rights in their images as against photographers, see Jessica Silbey, Control over 
Contemporary Photography: A Tangle of Copyright, Right of Publicity, and the First Amendment, 
42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 351 (2019); Eva E. Subotnik, The Author Was Not an Author:  
The Copyright Interests of Photographic Subjects from Wilde to Garcia, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS  
449 (2016). 
 118.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 119.  See, e.g., Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 
1044 (9th Cir. 2015) (denying protection to a sequence of yoga poses because, among other 
reasons, “‘successions of bodily movement’ often serve basic functional purposes”). Compare 
with Bambauer, supra note 4, at 2070–78 (advocating to treat unscripted sexual activity as 
authorship). 
 120.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 121.  Id. § 101 (defining “fixed” works). 
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law does not protect those moves separately from the video itself, 
and the videographer owns the copyright to that.122 
While the WorldStarHipHop pugilist’s copyright claim might 
seem fanciful, the facts of Garcia v. Google123 may appear more 
sympathetic to the claimant. The legal claims are equally 
unmeritorious, however. 
Garcia involved a movie entitled The Innocence of Muslims. The 
movie producer retained actress Cindy Lee Garcia originally to 
appear in a video called Desert Warrior. Allegedly, Garcia and the 
producer never signed a written contract. The producer 
misrepresented to Garcia the nature of the final video; instead of 
being a story about life in Egypt 2000 years ago, the producer made 
a video with an anti-Muslim message. That video included a five 
second clip of her performance, but the producer dubbed anti-
Muslim words over her clip. As a result, the public video did not 
include Garcia’s voice or recorded dialogue; it only depicted her 
likeness and movements. 
The producer posted the video to YouTube. Garcia’s  
depiction in the published video led to a fatwa condemning her 
(and others involved in the video) to death, resulting in death 
threats against her. 
Seeking to remove the movie from YouTube, Garcia sued 
YouTube in state court for a variety of privacy torts.124 These claims 
were preempted by Section 230, so the trial court denied a request 
for a temporary restraining order taking down the video.125 
This ruling pushed Garcia to seek legal alternatives that would 
avoid Section 230’s immunity. As a result, Garcia dropped her 
privacy claims.126 Instead, she claimed she owned a copyright in her 
acting performance and sent multiple takedown notices to 
	
 122.  Federal copyright law does restrict the unauthorized recording of (unfixed) live 
musical performances (bootlegging). Id. § 1101(a). Many states have analogous statutes. 
 123.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by 766 F.3d 929 (9th 
Cir. 2014); rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). Professor Goldman contributed to 
amicus briefs encouraging the Ninth Circuit to take the case en banc and reverse the three-
judge panel ruling. Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support of Google, Inc. 
and YouTube, LLC’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 
(9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-57302). 
 124.  Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2012-09-19-Complaint.pdf. 
 125.  Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2012), http://www. 
dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2012-09-20-Order%20denying%20TRO.pdf. 
 126.  Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d at 738. 
002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20  12:37 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
960 
	
YouTube under the DMCA for unlawful publication of her 
allegedly copyrighted work.127 YouTube refused the takedown 
request on the basis that the filmmaker, not Garcia, was the lawful 
claimant under the DMCA. Garcia then filed suit in federal court128 
alleging that she had a copyright in her acting performance and that 
YouTube’s publication of the video infringed that copyright. The 
district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction.129 
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit issued an 
overbroad and disturbingly secret takedown order to YouTube,130 
apparently motivated by the death threats against Garcia. Then, the 
Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the ruling in 
favor of Garcia in a 10-1 decision.131 
The en banc majority principally based its ruling on a conclusion 
that movie actors do not have a copyright interest separate from the 
movie recording, even when the actor does not have a written 
agreement with the producer.132 The majority also noted the 
obvious fixation problem: 
For better or for worse, [the film producer] “fixed” Garcia’s 
performance in the tangible medium . . . . However one might 
characterize Garcia’s performance, she played no role in fixation. 
On top of this, Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s 
ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed in Innocence of 
	
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV 12-08315-MWF-VBKx, 2012 WL 12878355 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012). 
 129.  Garcia v. Nakoula, No. 12-CV-08315-MWF-VBKx, 2012 WL 12878355 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 30, 2012). 
 130.  E.g., Venkat Balasubramani, In Its “Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the Ninth Circuit 
Is Guilty of Judicial Activism—Garcia v. Google, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-its-innocence-of-muslims-ruling-the-
ninth-circuit-is-guilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm. 
 131.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d at 733. 
 132.  The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances requires recognition of actors’ 
rights separate from the movie recording. See Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ 
beijing/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). The United States has signed the Beijing Treaty, but 
Congress has not passed implementing legislation. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults. 
jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=841 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). For a recent analysis of how actors 
may claim copyright in their performance, see Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American 
Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
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Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the film or her cameo in it 
was fixed “by or under [her] authority.”133 
The court concluded that “Garcia’s harms are too attenuated 
from the purpose of copyright” and denied her copyright claim and 
request for relief.134 
Important for our purposes, the majority understood that 
Garcia was using copyright as an end-run around privacy law: 
Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies tailored to 
Garcia’s personal and reputational harms. On that point, we offer 
no substantive view. Ultimately, Garcia would like to have her 
connection to the film forgotten and stripped from YouTube. 
Unfortunately for Garcia, such a “right to be forgotten,” although 
recently affirmed by the Court of Justice for the European Union, 
is not recognized in the United States.135 
The majority made particular note of how copyright can 
effectuate prior restraints, “the least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment rights.”136 
[The panel’s takedown order] gave short shrift to the First 
Amendment values at stake. The mandatory injunction censored 
and suppressed a politically significant film—based upon a 
dubious and unprecedented theory of copyright. In so doing, the 
panel deprived the public of the ability to view firsthand, and 
judge for themselves, a film at the center of an international 
uproar.  
. . . The panel’s takedown order of a film of substantial interest to 
the public is a classic prior restraint of speech.137 
Without explicitly addressing the privacy or copyright overlap, 
the court concluded that caution must be taken when copyright is 
	
 133.  Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d at 744. 
 134.  Id. at 746. 
 135.  Id. at 745. As Judge McKeown later wrote, “[T]here was a fundamental mismatch 
between Garcia’s claimed harm (death threats and reputational harm) and the purpose of 
the copyright laws (to stimulate creative expression, not to protect secrecy). . . . [C]opyright 
laws were not the right vehicle for her legitimate beef . . . .” McKeown, supra note 5, at 7 
(footnote omitted). 
 136.  Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 137.  Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d at 747 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 
550 (1993)); see also Amended Order, Garcia v. Google, Inc., No. 12-57302 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(Judge Reinhardt’s dissent to the denial of an emergency en banc rehearing, expanding on the 
multitudinous First Amendment problems with the takedown order). 
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used to suppress content on the Internet. The doctrine and purpose 
must align, and when other claims are more germane, such as 
privacy torts, those remedies should be considered instead.138 
We agree. For reasons related to sound copyright policy 
(production, dissemination, and progression of knowledge), 
copyright claims like Garcia’s should be swiftly dismissed.139 
Failure of copyright claims does not affect the success or failure of 
the appropriate tort claims, however.140 It is to those we now turn. 
IV. REFLECTING PRIVACY VALUES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
As this Article demonstrates, there is significant interest in 
using copyright law as a memory hole.141 And as Professor 
Margaret Chon has said, “privacy concerns have always been a 
part, albeit a minor aspect, of copyright law.”142 So under what 
conditions should copyright actually facilitate memory holes? This 
Part identifies the social values that privacy law protects and the 
circumstances in which those values coincide with proper 
copyright claims. 
	
 138.  For contrary perspectives about the breadth of actors as copyright authors, see, for 
example, F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures 
Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA  L.  REV . 225, 228, 306 (2001); Hughes, supra note 132. 
 139.  Copyright claims can be asserted for reputation or privacy-related reasons in other 
ways beyond the three we discuss. For example, purported employers or joint-authors, both 
exaggerating their rights under the work-for-hire or joint-authorship doctrines, can attempt 
work-arounds of ownership and authorship rules in order to suppress speech for privacy 
and reputational reasons. Both of these doctrines avoid the otherwise-strong statute of frauds 
rule for copyright transfers, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2018), and may provide sympathetic factual 
bases for ruling in the copyright claimant’s favor. To the extent that these doctrines seek to 
suppress content for reasons unrelated to “promot[ing] the progress of science and the useful 
arts,” they should also fail. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. These cases concern dubious attempts 
at copyright acquisition to assert rights unrelated to authorship. Consumers or depicted 
subjects who are also copyright authors and seek to retract their own expression or prevent 
distortion of their expression present a separate, but related, issue, addressed infra Part B. 
 140.  See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 141.  Other articles addressing the copyright/privacy overlap include: Balganesh, supra 
note 73; Chon, supra note 4; Gilden, supra note 4; Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of 
Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833 (2016); Gordon, supra note 7; Keller, supra note 
51; Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379 (2016); 
McKeown, supra note 5; Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law?, in 
PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 
2015); Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 501 
(2007); Tehranian, supra note 51; Tushnet, supra note 4. 
 142.  Chon, supra note 4. 
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A. A Taxonomy of Privacy Interests 
The U.S. Constitution provides a baseline set of principles for 
protecting privacy. The Bill of Rights, in particular, defines 
boundaries between the individual and the state that shape our 
fundamental right to privacy as well as its relationship to the right 
of free speech.143 
Although constitutional interpretation is flexible to ensure 
relevance for future generations, it is also grounded in textual 
promises in the Bill of Rights, as well as fundamental values such 
as liberty and autonomy.144 Meant “to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs,” the U.S. Constitution is a “great outline” 
that delimits (through its federalism structure and its protection of 
individual rights) basic principles for negotiating the relationship 
between individual freedoms, regulated group behavior, and 
government (state and federal) power.145 
Through constitutional interpretation, privacy has been 
inextricably linked to these fundamental values in cases such as 
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) (protecting a person’s choice to direct 
education of one’s children),146 Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
(protecting a person’s choice to use birth control),147 and Katz v. 
United States (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone 
calls).148 Furthermore, privacy itself acts as a cornerstone of 
	
 143.  ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 4 (Cheshire 
Calhoun ed. 2011) (describing everyday meanings of privacy that “fall into a handful of 
easily illustrated categories,” partially tracking the constitutional protection against 
governmental intrusion of physical and spatial privacy and decisional and associational 
privacy); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 643 (2007) (identifying deeply rooted constitutional privacy concepts). 
 144.  Equality as a fundamental value did not return to the Constitution until after the 
Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, but it originated as a national value in the 
Declaration of Independence. 
 145.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
 146.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law that 
prohibits teaching in a school any language but English because the law intrudes into 
childrearing privacy and autonomy). 
 147.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965) (identifying a “zone of privacy” 
through the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment, and the concept of “ordered liberty” in 
the Fourteenth Amendment that protects a married couple’s decision from state intrusion 
concerning whether to use contraception and bear children). 
 148.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 58–59 (1967). 
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constitutional rights and civil liberties today.149 These cases and 
others developed the right of privacy throughout the twentieth 
century to reflect industrial, medical, and technological advances. 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has used  
the concept of “reasonable expectations of privacy” to interpret 
society’s evolving needs and desires for privacy in light of  
these changes.150 
Supreme Court case law interpreting the Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights describes how it advances privacy interests in several 
identifiable categories. 
1. Spaces and things 
The Third and Fourth Amendments protect privacy for a 
person’s spaces and things,151 including one’s “houses, papers, and 
effects.”152 This protection has expanded over time to include 
chattel, such as cars and cellphones.153 This privacy interest may 
provide the strongest case for recognition in copyright law as a way 
to protect intangible works of expression embodied (or “fixed”) in 
tangible property. 
2. Bodies 
Constitutional privacy also protects various aspects of a 
person’s body, including restrictions on forced medical treatments, 
bodily searches, and reproduction or sterilization.154 Copyright law 
	
 149.  NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 5–7 (2015) (harmonizing civil liberties of privacy and free speech); see also 
Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, slip. op. at 12 (2018) (extending Fourth Amendment 
protections to new technologies and relationships with technology intermediaries that 
enable an unforeseen ability to track “familiar, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations” from location records that “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 150.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (search of telephone communication subject to limitation 
of “reasonable expectation of privacy” in those communications, extending Fourth 
Amendment protection to new technologies). 
 151.  See Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 553 (2016). 
 152.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 153.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (search of cell phone requires warrant); 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (search of car violated Fourth Amendment). 
 154.  See Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2010) 
(tracing the right to privacy from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965), to Lawrence 
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is not a good candidate for protecting a person’s interests in their 
physical body.155 However, copyright law sometimes protects 
depictions of people, and that protection can implicate bodily 
integrity and autonomy. We discuss in Part IV.B the doctrinal 
difficulty raised by these cases, especially with post-publication 
retraction attempts. 
3. Beliefs and relationships 
The right to privacy also extends to a person’s relationships  
and beliefs via the First Amendment and its penumbra.156 This  
can include spiritual and intellectual privacy when the state’s 
intrusion into religion and political association degrades 
intellectual freedom.157 
Courts often apply the First Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment together to protect privacy in personal relationships. 
For example, the Supreme Court recently declared that states 
cannot criminalize consensual sexual adult intimacy because doing 
so “demean[s] [people’s] existence or control[s] their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”158 The Supreme 
	
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), by looking at its role in abortion jurisprudence and sexual 
liberty rights). 
 155.  Cf. Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511 (2013) (discussing 
some of the problems with providing copyright protection for tattoos); Yolanda M. King, The 
Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129 (2013); Yolanda M. King, 
The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 29 (2014). 
 156.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 646. 
 157.  LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1160–61 (2d ed. 1988) (“The 
free exercise clause was at the very least designated to guarantee freedom of conscience by 
preventing any degree of compulsion in matters of belief.”); see also RICHARDS, supra  
note 149. 
 158.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2016) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
578). One root of these privacy cases is Griswold v. Connecticut, as Justice Roberts states in his 
dissent in Obergefell. 
The majority suggests that “there are other, more instructive precedents” 
informing the right to marry. Although not entirely clear, this reference seems to 
correspond to a line of cases discussing an implied fundamental “right of privacy.” 
Griswold, 381 U.S., at 486. In the first of those cases, the Court invalidated a criminal 
law that banned the use of contraceptives. Id. at 485–486. The Court stressed the 
invasive nature of the ban, which threatened the intrusion of “the police to search 
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.” Id. at 485. In the Court’s view, such  
laws infringed the right to privacy in its most basic sense: the “right to be let 
alone.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 n.10 (1972) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
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Court declared marriage one of the “great relations in private 
life”159 and what goes on in the bedroom is protected by privacy  
“in its most basic sense.”160 Indeed, many friendships, families  
and intimacies—the bonds of civil society—are unimaginable 
without privacy.161 
Copyrighted works may represent, critique, or expose an 
author’s or other person’s beliefs and relationships. The desire to 
control the public presentation of these beliefs and relationships 
leads some to want to temporarily or permanently suppress 
copyrighted content (and the facts and ideas it contains). Protecting 
people’s beliefs and relationships is a key value for privacy law, but 
these interests can collide with other important social interests and 
fundamental values, such as free speech, facilitating knowledge 
and scientific progress, and the intellectual autonomy of speakers. 
In Part IV.B, we discuss cases concerning this collision and 
advocate for limiting copyright’s ability to suppress already-
published information concerning relationships and beliefs, 
despite their sometimes-private nature. 
4. Personal Information 
Privacy in personal information remains weakly 
constitutionalized, but a growing number of statutes regulate 
personal data and information. Alan Westin’s seminal book Privacy 
and Freedom described circles of personal information: that which 
we tell no one (innermost circle); that which we tell only our 
intimates (next innermost circle); and so on until there is 
information known to everyone.162 Today, federal and state statutes 
draw these circles for us around educational information, health 
information, and financial information, for example. However, to 
	
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619–20 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (some citations omitted). 
 159.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (quoting William Blackstone’s 
commentaries). 
 160.  Id. at 2620. 
 161.  Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968) (“Privacy is not merely a good 
technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply 
inconceivable.”). 
 162.  ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967). 
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date, the constitutional right to protect personal factual information 
does not exist.163 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has addressed the privacy 
intrusion of the aggregation of information in photographs, emails, 
telephone contacts, physical movements, and “familial, political, 
professional, religious and sexual associations” contained 
therein.164 Preventing government from accessing the private 
collection (by a cellphone company) of massive amounts of factual 
information—e.g., geographic locations and phone calls—
implicates the right of privacy.165 
What counts as “personal information” subject to regulation 
and protection from governmental intrusion and forced 
divulgation reflects contemporary concerns.166 The origins of this 
debate about the fundamental protection of personal information is 
commonly attributed to the 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The 
Right to Privacy, by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.167 This was 
around the time of the popularity of the “snap camera” and the rise 
of yellow journalism, which collectively made it possible for the 
penny press to broadly expose an individual’s private life.168 
Warren and Brandeis wrote: 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next 
step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for 
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to 
be let alone.” Instantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
	
 163.  Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 649–51 (describing the various constitutional 
spheres of privacy and how information privacy has yet to be included except statutorily). 
 164.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)) (describing privacy invasions from searching location data 
and content of personal cell phones). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 649. For a discussion of how to determine whether 
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy for private information shared under a 
theory of social networks, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72  
U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). 
 167.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 168.  Id. at 195. 
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good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.”169 
In response to these new technological developments, Warren 
and Brandeis proposed a “right to privacy” that “secures to each 
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”170 They disconnect this right to privacy in personal 
information from copyrighted works, regardless of the work’s 
“nature or value.”171 They say: 
Under our system of government, [a person] can never be 
compelled to express [his thoughts, sentiments and emotions] 
(except when upon the witness-stand); and even if he has chosen 
to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the 
limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of 
this right does not depend upon the particular method of 
expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by 
signs, in painting, by sculpture, or in music. Neither does the 
existence of the right depend upon the nature or value of the 
thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the means of 
expression. The same protection is accorded to a casual letter or 
an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay, to a 
botch or daub and to a masterpiece. In every such case the 
individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be 
given to the public. No other has the right to publish his 
productions in any form, without his consent. This right is wholly 
independent of the material on which, the thought, sentiment, or 
emotion is expressed.172 
Other than recent United States Supreme Court cases protecting 
individuals from the state’s intrusive collection of aggregated 
information without a warrant—through GPS tracking or cell 
phone towers, for example—no constitutional right to protect the 
privacy of personal information has yet arisen from the Warren and 
Brandeis article.173 Instead, over the past century, we have seen  
	
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 198. 
 171.  Id. at 199. For a critique of Warren and Brandeis’ analysis of copyright as excluding 
privacy interests and their insufficient consideration of the authorial interests in “censorial 
copyright” claims, see Balganesh, supra note 73. 
 172.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 198–99 (citations omitted).  
 173.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (government 
collection of third-party cellphone tower data for a suspect is subject to Fourth Amendment 
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the proliferation and widespread recognition of four privacy  
torts: public disclosure of private facts, false light, 
misappropriation (commonly called “publicity rights”), and 
intrusion into seclusion.174 
Warren and Brandeis acknowledged several First Amendment 
caveats to their argument for a right to privacy, including: (1) 
matters that are in the “public or general interest” (an admittedly 
broad category), and (2) “publication of the facts by the individual, 
or with his consent.”175 The common law privacy tort doctrines 
incorporate these concerns by including First Amendment defenses 
that reflect the prerogative of the freedom of speech and press. 
Common law privacy torts are further constrained by federal 
copyright preemption.176 By definition, copyright does not protect 
facts or ideas, whether or not those facts or ideas were private or 
previously undisclosed.177 Accordingly, copyright’s federal 
preemption of overlapping state law prevents state-based torts 
from providing copyright-like protection for facts and ideas.178 
Despite these limitations, privacy law and theory has grown in 
importance over the past several decades alongside major 
technological developments. Contemporary theories of 
“intellectual privacy” extend Warren and Brandeis’ article by 
claiming a “right to be let alone,” making strong arguments for 
protecting private conversations and spaces. Such a right would 
foment the ability to think and develop ideas without social and 
political constraints, especially in a world more crowded than ever 
with surveillance and privacy-reducing technology.179 
Contemporary intellectual privacy, a mixture of the forms of 
privacy described above, is said to protect the “diversity of 
personal choices and actions,”180 promote social order through the 
	
scrutiny); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (GPS tracking of a suspect’s car without 
a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 174.  Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON 
PRIVACY §§ 1.3–1.4 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2006). A fifth tort, breach of confidence, is not 
widely recognized. Id. at § 1.4.1[A][2][d]. See also Prosser, supra note 17, at 389. 
 175.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 214, 218. 
 176.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 177.  See id. § 102(b). 
 178.  See id. § 301. 
 179.  RICHARDS, supra note 149. 
 180.  HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 77 (2010). 
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flourishing of debate (which is essential to democratic self-
government), bind communities together around shared interests 
despite individualized differences, and foster the production of 
aesthetic and scientific goods.181 In the digital age, the demands for 
these forms of privacy have only grown louder. 
As the exponential growth of digital data has increased interest 
in constitutional and statutory privacy law, copyright law finds 
itself more often pressed into service to protect personal 
information and intellectual privacy. As a result, the “partnership” 
of privacy and copyright creates troubling tensions for copyright 
doctrine understood to promote the public dissemination of 
expression and knowledge. 
B. When Should Copyright Facilitate Memory Holes? 
The previous section categorized constitutional privacy 
interests and traced their intersections with copyright law. This 
subpart considers when copyright protection should incorporate 
privacy considerations, i.e., when the pairing of privacy and 
copyright law makes sense in terms of aligned policy goals.182 We 
approach this by considering four types of works: (1) never-
published or disseminated works, (2) limited-dissemination  
works, (3) nostalgic remembrances by heirs, and (4) photographs 
and videos. 
1. Never-disseminated works 
Copyright law has long protected an author’s decision about 
how and when to first publish his or her works. Unauthorized 
publication of unpublished works formed the basis of a key 
	
 181.  Id. at 86–88 (citing PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY (1995)). 
 182.  We focus on liability considerations, but there may be other helpful interplays 
between copyright and privacy doctrines. Cf. j. remy green, A (Nude) Picture is Worth a 
Thousand Words—But How Many Dollars?: Using Copyright as a Metric for Harm in “Revenge 
Porn” Cases, 45 RUTGERS L. REC. 170 (2018) (arguing that copyright damages are a good way 
of measuring harm in nonconsensual pornography cases); Keller, supra note 51 (copyright 
remedies could provide a model for remedies in online privacy violations). 
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eighteenth-century British copyright case,183 which concluded that 
the core right of copyright is the author’s right to first publication.184 
Publishing a work without the author’s permission can harm 
the author in several ways. Prior to 1978, publication was a 
prerequisite for federal copyright protection (unpublished works 
were only eligible for protection under state/common law).185 
Unauthorized publication divested the author of copyright 
protection, including the decision whether the work should be 
published at all.186 Unauthorized publication also preempts the 
author’s decision about what constitutes the final version of a work, 
including what details it includes or excludes. If the work was 
never intended for publication, unauthorized publication may 
disclose the private information of the author and others, invading 
the author’s intellectual privacy.187 This may discourage authors 
from recording their thoughts as part of intellectual exploration 
and knowledge dissemination. These potentially significant 
unwanted consequences contravene copyright’s purpose. For these 
reasons, Congress and the courts strongly protect authors’ first 
publication decisions.188 
	
 183.  E.g., Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608; 2 Atk. 342; see also Mark Rose, The Author 
in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1992). 
 184.  For a history of the right of first publication in copyright, see Deborah R. Gerhardt, 
Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 140–142 (2011). 
 185.  Gordon, supra note 7, at 45–46. Because copyrights are now principally governed 
by federal law, we do not address past or current state/common-law copyrights. Unlike the 
federal statute, state common-law copyright statutes do not necessarily advance the U.S. 
Constitution’s aim to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” See, e.g., Zvi S. 
Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (2018) (demonstrating the 
significant breadth and scope of state common-law copyright compared to federal 
copyright). Also, federal copyright law expressly preempts inconsistent state laws. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (2012). To the extent federal copyright law conflicts with some forms of privacy claims 
to suppress copyrighted works as works, any residual common law copyrights should be 
preempted. See, for example, ROTHMAN, supra note 117, arguing for the separation of privacy 
and copyright to protect different interests in the digital age. 
 186.  Gerhardt, supra note 184, at 136 (describing consequences of uncontrolled 
publishing—in this case without notice or registration—of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have 
a Dream” speech). 
 187.  Balganesh, supra note 73; Keller, supra note 51. 
 188.  E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012) (consideration of “nature of the work,” including its 
unpublished status, is part of fair use analysis); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that an author’s control over unpublished letters supersedes third parties’ rights to 
publish extracts under fair use). 
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Thus, it seems appropriate to provide copyright protection for 
unpublished works even when an author seeks to enforce those 
rights for authorial privacy considerations. However, the privacy 
interests should be qualified by copyright’s existing doctrinal 
limits, such as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.189 We 
discuss fair use in more detail in Part V.A. 
Monge v. Maya Magazines illustrates the tensions between never-
disseminated works, privacy, and copyright. In Monge, a celebrity 
singer and model sued a gossip magazine over dissemination  
of wedding pictures leaked by an assistant.190 Though the singer did 
not take the photographs, the court let her bring a copyright claim 
anyway.191 
The Ninth Circuit held that the photos’ potential 
newsworthiness did not justify fair use,192 even though news 
reporting normally qualifies for fair use.193 The court instead 
concluded that the publication was not transformative and was 
“undisputedly commercial in nature.”194 Even more significant, the 
couple kept the photos secret—secluded, in constitutional privacy 
parlance—from everyone, even their own families.195 The court 
concluded that the right of first publication was stronger than the 
public’s right to know.196 Further, the Court explicitly sidelined 
privacy law: 
Although the published photos were not highly artistic in nature, 
they do have a defining and common characteristic—until Issue 
633 hit the stands, they were unpublished. We pointedly note that 
we address the unpublished status of the photos only under 
copyright principles, not privacy law . . . . Maya’s publication 
	
 189.  Following the Harper & Row decision, Congress amended the fair use statute to 
say: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such a 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 190.  Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 191.  Samuelson, supra note 141, at 194–95 (speculating that Monge purchased the 
copyrights from the photographer). 
 192.  Monge, 688 F.3d at 1176; cf. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 
(1st Cir. 2000). 
 193.  Monge, 688 F.3d at 1173. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (including “news reporting” 
as exemplary of fair uses). 
 194.  Id. at 1176. 
 195.  Id. at 1169. 
 196.  Id. at 1164. 
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undoubtedly supplanted Plaintiffs’ right to control the first public 
appearance of the photographs.197 
The legal wrinkles in the plaintiff’s case—the plaintiff’s dubious 
copyright ownership in the photos and the fact that a secret 
wedding between two celebrities is news—did not persuade the 
majority, despite a lengthy dissent.198 Indeed, but for the seclusion 
interest, Monge v. Maya resembles the Supreme Court case of Harper 
& Row v. Nation, in which the Court held that first publication of a 
purloined manuscript detailing critical historical events was not 
fair use.199 
The Monge case provides a sympathetic set of facts for the 
plaintiff, but so will most cases involving the unconsented first 
publication of never-published works that may not have been 
meant for publication. It is reasonable for copyright law to apply to 
never-disseminated works that were “purloined” and published 
for the first time by an unauthorized publisher, whether or not the 
author or copyright owner ever intended to publicly disseminate 
the work. 
The ease of broad distribution on the Internet raises the 
likelihood that more cases will be brought by sympathetic 
plaintiffs, such as Cindy Lee Garcia, for whom the copyright claim 
is weak but the sympathies for the plaintiff are strong. In those 
cases, especially when there has been only limited publication  
of the work as described more below, courts may be tempted  
to stretch copyright law to rule in the plaintiff’s favor. For all  
the reasons already discussed, we urge restraint to conform  
with copyright’s ultimate aim of the “progress of science”  
through dissemination. 
2. Limited-dissemination works200 
Never-disseminated works pose the most favorable situation 
where the law should accommodate the overlaps between 
copyright and privacy. However, such facts are relatively rare, 
	
 197.  Id. at 1177–78 (quotation marks omitted). For critiques of this reasoning, see 
Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Balganesh, 
supra note 73. 
 198.  Monge, 688 F.3d at 1170 n.2. 
 199.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). 
 200.  This subpart focuses on writings. A later subpart looks more closely at the 
unauthorized dissemination of photographs and videos. 
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especially in the Internet era. More common are “limited-
dissemination” cases. 
Copyrightable works can be disseminated on a limited basis, 
something between never-disseminated (always in the author’s 
possession) and fully published to the public. Indeed, limited 
dissemination was fairly common historically.201 Many 
copyrightable works, such as personal letters, were seen only by the 
small number of people who had physical access to them. 
These works remained with a limited audience intentionally or 
because of the costs of reproducing the work onto new chattel and 
distributing the chattel to third parties. Because chattel access 
functionally limited the audience for the work, many copyrightable 
works had some degree of de facto privacy. 
Copyright law explicitly distinguishes ownership of the chattel 
from ownership of copyrighted works that are part of the chattel.202 
For example, the recipient of a physical letter owns the letter as 
chattel but does not obtain any copyright interest to publish the 
letter’s contents further.203 This divided ownership rule protects the 
author’s privacy interest in expressing themselves by giving the 
author some control over who gets to see the content.204 This 
implicit authorial control reinforces the broader policy interests in 
first publication.205 
The concept of “limited” publication has lost some coherence 
due to the Internet,206 which facilitates the reproduction and 
dissemination of works at virtually zero marginal cost.207 A content 
publisher might try to share the work with a limited audience 
through technological controls such as paywalls or password 
	
 201.  Gerhardt, supra note 184 at 171–175. 
 202.  17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
 203.  Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (holding that an executor may enjoin 
the publication of private letters of his testator); see also Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 
Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 1867) (“The only right to be enforced against the holder 
[of the letter] is a right to prevent publication . . . .”); Pope v. Curl (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 
608; 2 Atk. 342. 
 204.  Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 140–44 (2007) (describing protection of letters via laws of 
“confidential communications”). 
 205.  Gerhardt, supra note 184, at 140–42 (describing problem of limited publication 
doctrine and significance of first publication in copyright). 
 206.  Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 585 (2010). 
 207.  Schlachter, supra note 24, at 20. 
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authentication, but such works often leak from the initial intended 
audience to reach larger audiences.208 This makes it increasingly 
unrealistic to expect that expression communicated over the 
Internet can be restricted to limited audiences without significant 
effort. In other words, a limited Internet dissemination in the 
ordinary course may be an oxymoron. 
Sometimes, limited-dissemination works raise similar authorial 
privacy interests as never-disseminated works, such as fomenting 
communication, relationships, and intellectual autonomy as a 
precursor to valuable public expression. Because of these potential 
contributions to the intellectual commons, providing copyright 
protection to limited-dissemination works can also advance 
copyright’s overall policy goals. This is true when authors use 
password controls on digital works (such as emails, text messages, 
or web postings) in an attempt to keep the expressive work from 
the general public. 
Two recent cases demonstrate the implications when copyright 
claims for limited Internet disseminations do not advance these 
goals.209 Swatch involved the unauthorized dissemination of a 
conference call transcript for investors, which a third party 
published to expose a competitor’s business dealings.210  Diebold 
involved the publication of internal emails discussing flaws in 
voting machines.211 In both cases, the plaintiffs articulated privacy 
concerns but brought copyright infringement claims. Each court 
held that the unauthorized dissemination of the private 
communications was not copyright infringement. 
	
 208.  See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2013) (criticizing but acknowledging a line of cases that finds 
unreasonable expectation of privacy for posted content on Internet, even if password 
protected, citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002)). 
 209.  See Leval, supra note 140, at 1119 (“Notwithstanding that nearly all writings may 
benefit from copyright, its central concern is for the protection of material conceived with a 
view to publication, not of private memos and confidential communications that its authors 
do not intend to share with the public. The law was not designed to encourage shoppers to 
make written shopping lists, executives to keep orderly appointment calendars, or lovers to 
write love letters.”). 
 210.  Swatch Grp. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014) (no copyright 
infringement for unauthorized publication of sound recording and transcript of investor 
conference call). 
 211.  Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (no 
copyright infringement for publication of internal company emails revealing flaw in  
voting machines). 
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The Swatch outcome reflects that privacy was not a necessary 
condition for the investor conference call, which was intended to 
communicate important information to a wide group of people.212 
In Diebold, arguably the employee-author assumed the email would 
remain within the company. While not a classic authorial privacy 
interest, the author’s expectation of a limited audience might have 
been essential to the email’s creation. Nevertheless, the 
countervailing social interests in voting machine flaws—not 
dissimilar to the issues raised by whistleblowers—properly 
outweigh the privacy considerations.213 
As a result, the courts rightly concluded that the disseminations 
did not constitute copyright infringement. In fact, the precise injury 
in both cases was more like breach of confidence and trust, an 
ancient and rarely used tort,214 not copyright infringement.215 
Copyright is the wrong claim given its policy goals of production 
and dissemination of socially valuable knowledge and information 
and the plaintiffs’ aim in both cases for erasure or secrecy of that 
information. Information about voting machine flaws and investor 
concerns of publicly traded companies are properly of public 
interest and were at risk in both of these cases because of copyright 
law’s expanding use in privacy contexts. In contrast to the Swatch 
and Diebold examples, some limited-dissemination works, such as 
nonconsensual pornography, may lack both qualities of intentional 
authorship and socially valuable knowledge and information. We 
revisit those complexities in Part IV.B.4 below as part of our 
discussion of photos and videos. 
In sum, limited-dissemination works may retain enough 
privacy characteristics that they are the functional equivalent of 
never-disseminated works, in which case it is appropriate to 
recognize the copyright/privacy overlaps. Otherwise, limited 
dissemination sufficiently and properly erodes privacy interests  
as protected through copyright. Distorting copyright law to 
	
 212.  Swatch, 756 F.3d at 92. 
 213.  Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“It is hard to imagine a subject 
the discussion of which could be more in the public interest. If Diebold’s machines in fact do 
tabulate voters’ preferences incorrectly, the very legitimacy of elections would be suspect.”). 
 214.  Richards & Solove, supra note 204, at 156–57; see also Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach 
of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 713 (2017). 
 215.  See Leval, supra note 140, at 1119. 
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accommodate those circumstances undermines copyright’s  
social balance. 
3. Heirs and “nostalgic remembrances” 
We refer to heirs’ control over the deceased’s copyrighted 
works as “nostalgic remembrances.” Exercising this control raises 
complex and emotional interpersonal dynamics.216 Sometimes, the 
heirs seek to maximize the economic returns from the copyright 
legacy,217 and their copyright management practices resemble the 
practices of other profit-maximizing copyright owners. 
Other times, heirs exercise their control to address personal 
considerations, such as keeping public audiences from intruding 
into the private expressive domain of authors and their families.218 
For example, the estates of authors Willa Cather, James Joyce, and 
J.D. Salinger used copyright claims to restrict public access to the 
deceased’s drafts, letters, journals, and notes, including 
information contained therein.219 In privacy terms, the heirs’ 
decisions hindered intrusion into seclusion of intellectual and 
spatial dimensions—the right to keep one’s effects and mind free 
from the oversight of others.220 
	
 216.  See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 639 (2017); Eva E. Subotnik, 
Artistic Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253 (2017) [hereinafter Subotnik, Artistic 
Control]; Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead: Succession Law and the Postmortem 
Term, 29 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 77 (2015). 
 217.  Quinn Norton, The International Fight over Marcel DuChamp’s Chess Set,  
ATLANTIC, (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/the-
international-fight-over-marcel-duchamps-chess-set/404248/. 
 218.  See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 4, at 93-98. Professor Gilden describes how copyright 
can help manage personal boundaries, which can help promote kinship, community, and 
autonomy as well as shape the cultural memory of departed family members and other loved 
ones. These concerns are not limited to the deceased, however, so this argument pushes 
copyright to morph into a general-purpose tort for redressing a wide range of social ills. We 
prefer to keep copyright focused on the problems it was designed to solve, because 
expanding copyright more broadly creates several new problems, including the ill effects on 
speech discussed throughout this Article. 
 219.  Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216 (discussing cases). During his lifetime, 
J.D. Salinger successfully sued a biographer, Ian Hamilton, and his publisher, Random 
House, to enjoin a biography that incorporated his unpublished letters. Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that an author’s control over unpublished 
letters supersedes third parties’ rights to publish extracts under fair use). However, soon 
after this ruling, Congress amended fair use to make sure courts did not overweigh 
unpublished status, which may have undermined the precedential authority of the Second 
Circuit’s ruling. 
 220.  See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 645. 
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In other situations, heirs seek to manage the reputation of the 
deceased or people associated with the deceased.221 This may 
include preventing the publication of works that would sully the 
deceased’s reputation as an artist or creator, or works that may 
advance ideas or arguments antithetical to the deceased’s views.222 
And, like other situations illustrated in this Article, heirs’ privacy- 
and reputation-driven decisions can create tension with standard 
copyright doctrines. 
The copyright tensions can be exacerbated by the deceased’s 
instructions in a will or otherwise, as seen in well-known examples 
of authors instructing their estates to destroy all unpublished 
drafts, as Kafka famously did,223 or keep unpublished writing and 
letters private.224 With respect to never-disseminated works, the 
deceased’s desire for control after death can support the intellectual 
freedom while they are alive (i.e., providing authors with the 
freedom to think and explore without interference from prying 
eyes). Knowing that this non-interference will extend post-mortem 
enhances the freedom and possibly also the works’ creation. Using 
copyright to control the first publication of works, even when also 
protecting privacy interests related to publication, makes sense.225 
If privacy concerns are so strong, it might be tempting to expect 
the authors to destroy their private works while they are still alive, 
	
 221.  Gordon Bowker, An End to Bad Heir Days: The Posthumous Power of the Literary 
Estate, INDEPENDENT, (Jan. 6, 2012, 1:00 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/books/features/an-end-to-bad-heir-days-the-posthumous-power-of-the-
literary-estate-6285277.html. The copyright disputes regarding the James Joyce writings 
(letters and drafts) were about both Joyce’s reputation as a writer and the privacy of the 
family members and lovers he wrote about. 
 222.  See Gilden, supra note 216(describing the phenomenon more broadly); Leval, supra 
note 140, at 1118 (referring to the “widow censor”); see also Johnathan Band, Can You 
Copyright a Dream?, POLITICO MAGAZINE, (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2015/01/selma-martin-luther-king-can-you-copyright-a-dream-114187; 
Brittany Spanos, Marvin Gaye’s Children: What Our Father Would Say About Lawsuit, ROLLING 
STONE, (Mar. 18, 2015 10:15 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/marvin-
gayes-children-what-our-father-would-say-about-lawsuit-20150318. 
 223.  Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 257, 265–66 (citing JOSEPH SAX, 
PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 
46, 135–38 (1999) and Nili Cohen, The Betrayed (?) Wills of Kafka and Brod, 27 L. & LITERATURE 
1, 13 (2015)). 
 224.  Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 16–17 (citing Willa Cather’s will). 
 225.  When papers are placed in a restricted-access archive, such as James Joyce’s 
effects, this becomes analogous to a limited dissemination—and when used for scholarly 
purposes should usually be fair use. See Paul K. Saint-Amour et al, James Joyce: Copyright, Fair 
Use, and Permissions: Frequently Asked Questions, 44 JAMES JOYCE Q. 753 (2007). 
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rather than risk posthumous divulgation. However, this is a bad 
idea from an intellectual privacy perspective and inconsistent with 
our understanding of how authors actually work and express 
themselves. Authors initially write or create works principally for 
themselves, not for an audience.226 For many artists and authors, 
creating work is synonymous with thinking; it is essential to 
processing the world and one’s experiences in it.227 Capturing those 
expressions helps authors keep track of their lives and better 
understand them. If these materials are destroyed while the author 
is still alive, the author loses a lot more than paper. Authors often 
analogize the destruction of their works to suicide or death.228 
Fortunately, Max Brod (Kafka’s friend who was directed to 
destroy his works) did not burn Kafka’s manuscripts, and Willa 
Cather’s heirs eventually released her letters. Those documents will 
eventually enter the public domain.229 Still, the peace of mind that 
Cather and Kafka felt about copyright’s control over their private 
effects and intellectual works may have facilitated both living and 
writing as well as they did. 
These cases of heirs using copyright to exert posthumous 
control of never-published works contrast with copyright claims 
seeking to control already-published works of the deceased. These 
latter cases are weaker from copyright policy perspective despite 
raising similar privacy concerns. Two recent examples follow. 
First, The Beastie Boys sued the toy company Goldiblox for its 
parody of the song Girls in an advertisement for an engineering toy 
	
 226.  MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 107–26 (1996) (describing the fun of creating and the pleasure of 
flow that sustains creativity). 
 227.  Id. at 113–15 (describing creators’ goals centered on challenges, building skills and 
intrinsic problem solving about the world as they find it); see also SILBEY, EUREKA MYTH, supra 
note 3, at 39 (describing an author’s experience of writing as her “filter on the world” and 
how she “recycle[s] an experience . . . [to] ma[k]e order out of all this stuff that’s so hard  
to navigate”). 
 228.  SILBEY, EUREKA MYTH, supra note 3, at 87–88 (scientist comparing the shuttering of 
his project to his child’s death). 
 229.  Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 56 (describing risk that authors might 
destroy works rather than rely on untrustworthy heirs or an inconsistent legal system and 
arguing that allowing authors to preserve privacy through trusts may be a way to promote 
creativity so that when destruction is likely, trusts should be allowed). Also, copyrights last 
at least 70 years, while privacy rights usually expire upon death. Publicity rights can endure 
beyond the person in some states, like California’s extension for 70 years beyond death (CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2012)). In contrast, New York’s publicity rights terminate at death 
(N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Consol. 1995)). 
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directed at young girls.230 Deceased Beastie Boy Adam Yauch’s will 
specified that his music should not be used for “advertising 
purposes,” and the remaining band members sued to preserve  
that request.231 
Second, Marvin Gaye’s heirs sued Robin Thicke and Pharrell 
Williams over the song Blurred Lines. Gaye’s children explained that 
“through [dad’s] music . . . we find our compass and our paths 
moving forward. We are his children, but we too are his fans and 
we hold his music dear.”232 They described their vigilance in terms 
of being “caretakers” with “an obligation to . . . preserv[e] the 
integrity of the music so that future generations understand its 
origins and feel its effect as the artist intended.”233 
Heirs may frame their concerns in terms of their perception of 
the deceased’s artistic integrity, but copyright law does not 
recognize moral rights of non-authors, and it recognizes author’s 
moral rights only under very limited circumstances.234 Moreover, 
the heirs’ copyright assertions for already widely disseminated 
works do not advance interests in private spaces, things, bodies, 
existing relationships, or information.235 Instead, the heirs wield 
copyright to control how the public ascribes meaning to these 
works—a motivation that conflicts with copyright’s fair use 
doctrine and principles of the First Amendment. 
Heirs also appear motivated to preserve their families’ honor or 
“reinforce family ties” with the deceased.236 As Andrew Gilden and 
Eva Subotnik have explained, family and friends sometimes seek to 
	
 230.  Stuart Dredge, GoldieBlox Agreed to Pay $1M to Charity in Beastie Boys  
Settlement, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 4:17 AM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2014/may/13/goldieblox-beastie-boys-girls-settlement. 
 231.  Id.; see also Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 269. 
 232.  Spanos, supra note 222. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Largely because of its interference with the First Amendment, U.S. copyright law 
only recognizes artistic integrity in limited circumstances involving works of visual art. 17 
U.S.C. § 106A (2012). See supra note 19 and accompanying discussion. 
 235.  Gilden, supra note 216. Professor Gilden argues that copyright assertions by heirs 
(including for published works) may advance interests in bodily autonomy and personal 
relationships. He describes these interests as “boundary-management.” We see the 
copyright/privacy interface as largely rooted in constitutional notions of privacy. Professor 
Gilden’s article addresses much broader conceptions beyond privacy, including social 
relations and what he calls “kinship” and “community.” 
 236.  Eva Subotnik, Free as the Heir?: Copyright Successors and Stewardship (June 12, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 
216, at 276 (describing “reinforc[ing] family ties” as a basis for “dead-hand control”). 
002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20  12:37 PM 
929 Copyright’s Memory Hole 
	 981 
	
preserve memories of the deceased as they wished them to be, 
without modification by other people who remain alive.237 
Although privacy law protects family relationships,238 those 
privacy interests usually terminate at death.239 Heirs’ claims are 
posthumous by definition. 
Heirs’ efforts to control memories of authors are especially 
problematic when inhibiting the ability of other authors to build 
upon the cultural foundation of already-disseminated works. For 
example, Robin Thicke listened to and learned from past musicians, 
including Marvin Gaye, to make his own music. This is the way 
copyright law envisioned authors learning from and building upon 
each other’s works. Similarly, Goldiblox used the Beastie Boys’ 
song to make the important point that once derogatory and 
demeaning connotations—”Girls” objectified because of gender—
can be transformed into empowering messages. By allowing this 
accretive creative process, copyright law enables authors to extend 
earlier works and create new understandings of them. 
In sum, when heirs claim copyright to protect the deceased’s 
privacy or reputational interests, they affect other people’s lives 
and expressions. Suppressing the already-published work of the 
deceased author, even to protect a private relationship with the 
heir, erases memories for other people as well.240 The decision to 
create memory holes in other people’s lives should not reside solely 
in the hands of copyright heirs.241 Furthermore, excising the work 
	
 237.  Andrew Gilden, supra note 216, at 93-98; Andrew Gilden, Sinatra’s Mug and Post-
Mortem Publicity Rights, PRAWFSBLAWG, (Dec. 11, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2015/12/sinatras-mug-and-postmortem-publicity-rights.html; Subotnik, 
Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 276. 
 238.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2016); e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
 239.  RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 125–26 (2010). 
 240.  Professor Abraham Drassinower frames this discussion in terms of speech, not 
memories. ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015). Drassinower 
describes copyright as a “bilateral” right of both authors and speakers; thus, if copyright tilts 
too much towards authors’ interests, it does not sufficiently protect the rights of other 
speakers, including subsequent authors. For this reason, Drassinower believes that giving a 
copyright owner the right to enjoin other people’s speech conflicts with the fundamental 
structure of copyright law. 
 241.  Heirs sometimes feel constrained to manage the copyrights of the deceased in 
ways they may otherwise wish to avoid by force of inheritable transfer and to pay taxes. Our 
critique in this paper is with the management choices, not with the problem of inheritable 
copyright per se. But one way to alleviate the burden of descendible copyright is for it to 
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from public discourse distorts and depletes the information and 
cultural understandings about these works and relationships 
already in circulation. Privacy law does not permit such control 
over public work in light of the First Amendment and after one’s 
death. Copyright law should not permit such claims either. 
4. Photos and videos 
Visual media (e.g., photos and videos) potentially create extra 
conflicts between privacy and copyright.242 Photos and videos 
typically convey more comprehensive information compared to 
word descriptions. Moreover, a controversial or revealing photo or 
video circulates more widely and rapidly on the Internet than 
writing about the same person or event.243 In addition, the social 
meaning of exposed photos or videos that were intended to remain 
private, as is the case of many sexual images, is vastly different 
from the array of social meanings of already-published  
written works by authors.244 Thus, people depicted in photos  
or videos may feel that their dissemination is especially 
troublesome. Perhaps for this reason, the law (including privacy 
and copyright) tends to give photos and videos extra legal 
protections compared to other media.245 
	
expire at the death of the author—as privacy claims do—or sooner. We thank Andrew Gilden 
for pushing us on this point. 
 242.  This argument might also apply to audio recordings, which are also subject to 
extra privacy protections such as laws against nonconsensual recordings. For simplicity, we 
focus on visual media. 
 243.  See, e.g., Rachel Gillett, Why We’re More Likely to Remember Content with Images and 
Video, FAST COMPANY, (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3035856/why-
were-more-likely-to-remember-content-with-images-and-video-infogr (“[T]weets with 
images are 94% more likely to be retweeted than tweets without.”); Noah Kagan, Why 
Content Goes Viral: What Analyzing 100 Million Articles Taught Us, HUFFPOST, (June 13, 2014, 
6:51 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-content-goes-viral-wh_b_5492767 
(“[T]wice as many people, on average[,] share posts with at least one image in the post . . . .”); 
see also An Xiao Mina, That Merkel Photo is More Like a Meme than a Renaissance Painting, 
ATLANTIC, (June 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/ 
that-merkel-photo-is-more-like-a-meme-than-a-renaissance-painting/562505/. 
 244.  Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257, 1260 
(2010) (iconic public images generate multiple social and legal meanings beyond their initial 
contextual existence and origins); Jessica Silbey, Images in/of Law, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 171, 
172–75 (2012–13) (describing how images are intuitively understood and yet collectively 
inscrutable, posing unique problems for resolving legal conflicts that demand common and 
shared language). 
 245.  Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (2004) (critiquing courts’ treatment of film and photography as 
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Nonconsensual pornography—sometimes imprecisely called 
“revenge porn”—highlights some of the difficult doctrinal tensions 
between privacy and copyright protection for photos and videos. 
Nonconsensual pornography is “the distribution of private, 
sexually explicit images of individuals without their consent.”246 
Plaintiffs in nonconsensual pornography cases often do not own 
the copyright to the photo or video depicting them, so they have 
incentives to adopt some of the copyright acquisition techniques 
discussed in Part III.247 For all of the reasons discussed there, 
copyright may be ill-designed to redress the depicted person’s 
paramount privacy interests. 
So the question is: What are the respective scopes of privacy and 
copyright protection for photos and videos, and when should one 
doctrine fill any “gaps” in the other? Two cases (in addition to the 
cases discussed in Part III) provide some additional insights  
into the opportunities and pitfalls of copyright/privacy overlaps in 
this category. 
a. Hill v. Public Advocate. This case involved a conservative anti-
marriage equality advocacy organization that featured an 
engagement photo of a gay couple in an anti-gay political 
campaign.248 The professional photographer and the married 
couple sued Public Advocate for copyright infringement and 
misappropriation of likeness. The court dismissed the 
misappropriation claim on First Amendment grounds because 
Public Advocate’s use of the photo “reasonably relate[d] to . . . a 
matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern.”249 
However, the photographer’s copyright claim survived. The 
court concluded that the photo’s reuse may be infringing and not 
fair, despite its arguably transformative nature. In other words, the 
photograph’s newsworthiness extinguished the privacy claim but 
	
without need of interpretation in general); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: 
The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 686–87 (2012) (critiquing courts’ treatment of 
images in copyright law as either transparent or opaque, in each case denying the role and 
necessity of interpretation). 
 246.  Definitions, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/ 
definitions/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2019). 
 247.  Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 439–40 (2014) (discussing incidents of revenge porn and potential reach 
of copyright law to effect takedowns and damages). 
 248.  Hill v. Public Advocate, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1351–52 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 249.  Id. at 1355. 
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not the copyright claim. Public Advocate settled the copyright 
infringement claim by paying the photographer $2501.250 
b. Balsley v. LFP. The plaintiff in this case, a television 
newscaster, participated in a wet T-shirt contest in a public bar.251 
Without her consent, a photographer took a photo of her contest 
participation and published it in Lenshead.com, an adult website. 
After the photograph’s dissemination, the plaintiff lost her job. To 
limit further dissemination, the plaintiff bought the photo’s 
copyright. Subsequently, Hustler, a pornographic magazine, 
republished the photo, and the plaintiff sued Hustler for copyright 
infringement, privacy violations, and publicity rights violations. 
However, only the copyright infringement claim reached the jury. 
Finding no fair use, the jury awarded plaintiff $135,000 plus fees, 
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
Balsley and Hill resemble several other cases discussed in this 
Article (Monge, Garcia, and Katz). Unlike the claims in Garcia and 
Katz, the copyright claims in Balsley and Hill252 succeeded.253 Why? 
The circumstances concerning the photographs are materially 
different between the cases. For example, in both Balsley and Hill 
(unlike in Monge), the photo’s initial dissemination was by, or 
authorized by, the author. Balsley closely resembles Katz in that a 
public figure (or quasi-public figure) plaintiff acquired a photo’s 
copyright in order to suppress it. Unlike the plaintiff in  
Katz, however, the Balsley and Hill plaintiffs prevailed over a fair 
use defense. 
	
 250.  David Walker, Photographer Wins $2,501 for Infringement in Anti-Gay Attack Ad Case, 
PDNPULSE (June 23, 2014), https://pdnpulse.pdnonline.com/2014/06/photographer-wins-
2501-infringement-anti-gay-attack-ad-case.html. 
 251.  Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 747 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 252.  We do not analyze the publicity rights of both plaintiffs because they are beyond 
the scope of this article. See ROTHMAN, supra note 117. 
 253.  Two other unsuccessful copyright enforcements involving photographs or videos 
include: (1) Dhillon v. Does 1–10, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) 
(the defendant reused the plaintiff’s headshot fairly to criticize plaintiff’s political views); 
and (2) Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014) (a university president sought to 
suppress further dissemination of videos of which he was not the author because they 
supported others’ claims that he lied). 
These cases implicate false light more than intrusion upon seclusion or other privacy 
doctrines because the depictions were already widely disseminated. Nevertheless, they 
failed on both copyright and privacy grounds because the depictions were not false, and they 
had substantial newsworthiness and transformative value. 
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One hypothesis is that the Balsley and Hill plaintiffs had 
stronger arguments to undermine fair use. The fair use doctrine 
excuses some secondary copyright uses by using a multifactor test 
with the ultimate purpose of enabling more expression. When 
considering whether a secondary use is fair, courts evaluate the 
purpose and character of the secondary use, including whether the 
secondary use transformed, commented on, or critiqued the 
original work in any way. Other factors include the nature of the 
original work, the amount and substantiality of the original work 
taken by the secondary use, and the secondary use’s effect on the 
market for the original work or the value of the original work.254 
In Balsley, the photo republication was not transformative 
because the Lenshead and Hustler publications served the same 
purposes—voyeuristic entertainment. Conversely, in Katz and Hill, 
the republication criticized the photo’s subject, a classic fair use. 
Also, even though the plaintiff in Balsley didn’t have any interest in 
commercializing the photo, the jury found that the republications 
reduced her ability to market it (which would be relevant to fair 
use’s “market harm” factor).255 That conclusion seems artificial 
because the plaintiff wanted to keep the photo out of the 
marketplace entirely in order to erase all public knowledge of it 
(which was not the case in Hill).256 This is qualitatively different 
than a copyright owner “windowing” content257 to maximize 
economic returns. A suppression motivation is precisely what 
copyright law should not support. 
Yet, it is easy to imagine the jury sympathized with the plaintiff 
in Balsley. Balsley never had the choice of whether to publish the 
photo, and its dissemination damaged her career. The photo’s 
presentation was objectionable; Hustler included the photo in its 
“Hot News Babe” contest and described the plaintiff as a “tasty 
talking head.”258 Also, like cases involving nonconsensual 
pornography, Balsley involves “grave emotional and dignitary 
	
 254.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 255.  Id. § 107(4) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”). 
 256.  For a critique of this weak market harm analysis, see Gilden, supra note 197; see also 
Balganesh, supra note 73 (discussing the weak market harm analysis in Monge as well). 
 257.  See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3. 
 258.  Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2012). Similarly, had Hill reached a 
jury, the jury might have been sympathetic to the engaged couple and the fact that a political 
organization targeted their choice to be married. 
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harms,” increased “risks of physical assault,” and “chill[ed] self-
expression and ruin[ed] lives.”259 If the case did not involve 
sexualized images and the media’s exploitation and objectification 
of women, the plaintiff’s opportunistic copyright interest might 
have been less compelling to the jury.260 
The jury also might have sympathized with the plaintiff in 
Balsley because the wet T-shirt contest took place before a limited 
audience. In contrast, the Garcia actress expected to be in a widely 
disseminated film.261 However, this does not explain the pro-
plaintiff result in Hill, which involved photos taken in the open that 
were published first, with plaintiffs’ permission, on a public 
website. The plaintiffs in Hill or Monge might have secured their 
photos more carefully if they had feared their widespread 
dissemination and reuse, but they still would have created the 
photos. Authorial privacy interests were therefore less at play in 
both Hill and Monge. 
Balsley also participated in the wet T-shirt contest behind a 
business establishment’s doors, which ordinarily means that her 
actions would not be viewable to the world. However, the business 
establishment—a bar—arguably was still a public space. Both 
privacy law and the First Amendment allow reporting and 
depiction of events in public spaces. Copyright law should not 
usurp this public reporting function. The plaintiff in Balsley might 
have preferred not to have her participation in a wet T-shirt contest 
recorded, but her participation was squarely in the public sphere. 
Copyright law should not be used to erase content representing 
consensual public behavior at the expense of promoting other 
authors’ speech and public debate (the speech of bystander 
photographers, subsequent speakers about the photographs, and 
the media).262  
	
 259.  Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014). 
 260.  But see Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 273–304 (2007). 
 261.  Debate exists as to what kind of film Garcia consented to, but she did at least 
consent to her performance being published as a film. As the appellate decision indicates, 
she might have a fraud claim, but not a copyright claim. 
 262.  See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 399, 405 (2016) (critiquing copyright claims that assert privacy interests when they are 
not interests of authorship). 
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The pseudopublic location of Balsley’s activities weakens her 
privacy interests, making it especially problematic to distort 
copyright doctrine in an attempt to accommodate those privacy 
interests. But changing the focus of the privacy interests—say, 
activity in private spaces such as nonconsensual pornography—
should not strengthen the copyright interests of works that have 
been disseminated, even in a limited fashion. Authored works that 
have never been disseminated, however, may properly be the 
subject of a copyright claim as described above, aligning the spatial 
privacy and bodily privacy with the never-disseminated aspect of 
the copyrighted work. Nonconsensual pornography does not fall 
into that category, however, when it is not authored by the victim 
(when it is authored and owned by the defendant who 
disseminates without permission), or when it is authored and 
disseminated by the subject, albeit to a limited audience.263 The 
sympathetic nature of nonconsensual pornography claims has led 
to the persistent misuse of copyright in privacy-invasive settings by 
both courts and complainants, as previously discussed.264 
However, it has also led to more focused law reform efforts to 
protect victims outside the scope of copyright law.265 
In sum, although photos and videos can be especially privacy 
invasive, they should not be treated differently from other 
copyrighted works. Moreover, the qualities of photographs and 
videos as particularly attention-grabbing and capable of conveying 
comprehensive information reinforce the value of separating 
privacy and copyright interests. Otherwise, these very qualities of 
photographs and videos risk prioritizing privacy interests in every 
copyright case and paying inadequate attention to the other social 
values encoded into copyright law. 
	
 263.  A full analysis of nonconsensual pornography is beyond the scope of this article. 
A few sources on the topic: Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1 
(2012); Eric Goldman & Angie Jin, Judicial Resolution of Nonconsensual Pornography 
Dissemination Cases, 14 I/S: J.L. AND POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 283 (2018); Levendowski, supra 
note 247. 
 264.  See discussion of Monge and Garcia supra notes 131–146 and 207. 
 265.  See Advocacy, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivil 
rights.org/advocacy/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
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5. Why valorize copyright? 
Stepping back, the privacy injuries in most of the cases 
discussed in this Article are cogent and significant, namely bodily 
appropriation, intrusion into seclusion, and misappropriation of 
identity. Yet, these privacy claims fail. In contrast, the copyright 
claims are doctrinally slippery and misguided, yet sometimes they 
prevail. Why? 
Perhaps the success of the copyright claims and the failure of 
privacy claims is part of a broader phenomenon of the 
“propertization” of IP,266 where legal rights in intangible assets are 
considered to be “property” rights supported by strong pro-
property social norms that attach to ownership and control of land 
and personal property. If so, the law is biased in favor of property, 
and because privacy is not property, privacy claims fail.267 
An alternative hypothesis is that privacy and free speech are 
both important constitutional rights, but when they conflict, free 
speech prevails. In contrast, copyright is sometimes characterized 
as a private right that does not conflict with other important 
fundamental rights, such as the right of privacy and free speech.268 
These characterizations of copyright and privacy would naturally 
lead to copyright succeeding in cases where privacy claims must 
yield to the First Amendment. 
However, these characterizations are flawed. Copyright law is 
not just a private right. It aims to promote progress of science to 
benefit the public. As a power granted to Congress in pursuit of the 
public interest, permissible copyright limitations on free speech 
require consideration of public benefits as well as private interests. 
We cannot simply focus on the private benefit from suppressing 
photos and videos without considering the value of the secondary 
speech they promote. Otherwise, copyright law becomes a tool for 
	
 266.  For an overview of the literature and a critique of its inevitable strengthening of 
IP rights, see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 
DUKE L.J. 1 (2004). 
 267.  We do not condone this hierarchy of property over privacy or, for that matter, the 
characterization of copyright as property. See DRASSINOWER, supra note 240, at 22 (arguing 
against treating copyright as a property instead of a relationship between a person, his or 
her speech, and the audience). 
 268.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190, 219 (2003) (describing copyright as a 
“marketable right to the use of one’s expression” and that “[the First] Amendment and the 
Copyright Clause were adopted close in time . . . indicat[ing] the Framers’ view that 
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles”). 
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scrubbing unwanted content, an Orwellian device that stifles 
diverse expressions and critical conversations.269 If privacy must be 
protected—and there is much to deride in the privacy-invasive 
behavior of defendants described above—privacy law (or some 
other tort law) should protect it.270 Drafting copyright to perform 
that job derogates copyright’s service to the public interest in the 
progress of science. 
6. Recap 
Copyright and privacy can partner to spur creation and 
eventual dissemination of socially valuable works. The most 
significant and effective partnership is that of protecting never-
disseminated works during the author’s lifetime,271 where 
unapproved dissemination, or even the threat of such 
dissemination, can undermine the author’s intellectual freedom 
and thus authorial productivity. In most instances, however, using 
copyright to protect privacy produces untenable conflicts with 
fundamental rights, such as the right of free speech and the public 
interest in science and self-government that free speech promotes. 
Copyright law famously does not distinguish between high value 
and low value works (however that may be defined), leaving 
discrimination of treatment based on aesthetic or moral features of 
the work to the audience.272 Were privacy interests to become the 
proxy for aesthetic or content discrimination, enabling plaintiffs to 
claim stronger copyright because the subject of the work is 
particularly privacy invasive or allegedly not socially valuable, 
	
 269.  Using copyright to suppress factually misleading or inaccurate content to prevent 
distortion through deletion is equally problematic. First, these claims are better suited for 
defamation actions, with their balanced proof requirements and remedies. Second, First 
Amendment doctrine, which copyright incorporates, defaults to more speech (a 
“marketplace”), not less, to promote optimal quantity and quality of expression. See supra 
text accompanying note 14 (discussing the counterspeech doctrine). 
 270.  Leval, supra note 140; Tushnet, supra note 4, at 2349 (rejecting the use of copyright 
to protect subjects of intimate photographs from their unwanted dissemination and 
suggesting “the case for a new intellectual property (or more properly, privacy or dignity) 
right for people depicted in intimate photos and videos could most persuasively be made on 
its own merits”); see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Privacy, Copyright, and Letters, 3 ELON L. REV.  
161 (2012). 
 271.  Samuelson, supra note 141, at 198 (arguing that Warren and Brandeis “recognized 
that copyright’s utility in protecting privacy interests was salient only when works  
were unpublished”). 
 272.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
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copyright law’s promise of promoting diversity of expression and 
democratic engagement would falter. This outcome is worth 
resisting, and the next Part will explain how to do so. However, we 
do not intend to derogate the availability of recourse pursuant to 
privacy and reputation laws in situations where copyright recourse 
is improper or unavailable. 
V. FIGHTING COPYRIGHT’S MEMORY HOLE:  
SOME REFORM PROPOSALS 
This Article has explained how copyright’s deployment can 
erase content in order to protect privacy and reputation. It has also 
identified some limited circumstances in which copyright may be 
an appropriate tool for protecting privacy interests, especially 
when the work has never been disseminated and is not yet part of 
a public “memory.” In most or all other circumstances, deploying 
copyright to manage privacy and reputation abuses the purpose of 
copyright law and its foundation in the public interest and should 
not be countenanced. This Part considers doctrinal steps to inhibit 
the misapplication of copyright law for privacy purposes. 
A. Enhancing the Fair Use Doctrine 
The fair use doctrine is a multifactor test rendering the 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work beyond copyright law’s 
proscription.273 It considers: the purpose and character of the 
secondary use (including whether the secondary use 
“transformed” the work), the nature of the original work, the 
amount and substantiality of the original work taken by the 
secondary use, and the secondary use’s effect on the market for the 
original work or value of the original work.274 
Fair use already thwarts abusive enforcement actions, as Katz 
has demonstrated. The fair use doctrine can be further enhanced to 
inhibit and perhaps prevent other similar actions, especially using 
fair use’s “nature of the work” prong.275 
Typically, as part of this second factor, courts consider whether 
the work is more fact-like or fiction-like. In the cases concerning 
photography, for example, courts struggle with the level of 
	
 273.  Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH.  L. REV. 685 (2015). 
 274.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 275.  Id. 
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creativity and factual nature of the work. Where the use of the 
photo provides information that text could not adequately convey, 
such as the details of the WorldStarHipHop fight, fair use should 
favor disclosure. On the other hand, where text would 
communicate just as effectively as photos or videos, such as 
communicating the fact that the marriage took place in Monge, the 
second fair use factor might weigh against disclosure. Even then, 
where the depicted person might improperly dispute the facts, 
showing the photo or video helps discern the truth, and fair use 
should support that truth-validating function.276 
Courts also consider the published or unpublished nature of the 
work as part of the second fair use factor. When a work was not 
published but only disseminated privately, or first published 
without authority, protecting the work from further disclosure 
should be counted against fair use to protect the author’s or 
owner’s privacy interest in seclusion and the intellectual privacy 
coincident with authorship.277 This might fit the facts of Balsley and 
Monge, for example. Conversely, when a work was initially 
published legitimately, as in Hill and Katz, and the copyright claim 
is more akin to false light rather than first publication or intrusion 
into seclusion, the extant publication of the work should weigh 
towards fair use. 
The second fair use factor should also consider how and when 
copyright acquisition occurs. Post-publication acquisition by the 
person depicted in the work for the purpose of suppression should 
weigh towards disclosure.278 This would include works “about the 
owner” (as opposed to “by the owner”), such as headshots, 
	
 276.  See Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & 
CLASS 17, 45–46 (2008) (prescribing analytical uses of film and photographic evidence to 
maximize its truth-validating function and minimize its truth-distorting capability). 
 277.  For further discussion of a proposed relationship between fair use and 
unpublished works, see Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from 
the Right of First Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369 (2001). 
 278.  Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966) (“It 
would be contrary to the public interest to permit any man to buy up the copyright to 
anything written about himself and to use his copyright ownership to restrain others from 
publishing biographical material concerning him.”); Lee, supra note 141, at 386 (“In these 
cases brought by non-authors, the claim for protecting the author’s reputation or privacy 
over the work as a part of copyright law is diminished, if not destroyed . . . [False] author’s 
privacy and reputation are personal rights; to the extent copyright law protects them at all, 
the standing to assert such personal rights should be limited to authors.”). 
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business reviews, and videos taken of public activities.279 This 
implicitly privileges authors over other copyright owners,280 but 
such privileging is not unprecedented in copyright law. For 
example, the termination of transfer right is available only to a 
work’s author and heirs and not to assignees.281 
These suggestions indicate that the second fair use factor—
typically given little love in fair use analyses—has a much more 
significant role to play when copyright claims implicate privacy 
concerns. As a secondary benefit, this would take some pressure off 
the first and fourth factor, both of which confound courts when 
market injury or transformation is contestable. As illustrated in 
Katz, courts sometimes apply the “market effect” factor to 
acknowledge that the erasure attempt is illegitimate. However, in 
other cases (such as Balsley and Monge), courts analyze the fourth 
factor in ways that tautologically favor plaintiffs instead.282 
Fair use can be a costly defense to litigate. Courts are reluctant 
to grant fair use defenses on motions to dismiss,283 so a fair use 
defense usually would entail the costs of discovery and preparing 
summary judgment motions—efforts that can easily consume 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars.284 The 
substantial time and expense needed for fair use defenses act as a 
deterrent to litigating them, even if the court might subsequently 
award attorneys’ fees. Therefore, configuring fair use doctrines to 
efficiently sort legitimate copyright claims from those motivated 
primarily by privacy concerns would be a good step, but the 
recourse still may not be cost effective. 
	
 279.  Some works, like selfies, are both “by” and “about” the owner. The “by the owner” 
part should be given priority in those cases. 
 280.  See Balganesh, supra note 73 (proposing to limit the ability to bring “censorial 
copyright” claims to authors). 
 281.  17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
 282.  Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We agree with Plaintiffs that 
their current desire or ability to avail themselves of the market for the Bosley photograph is 
immaterial to the issue outlined by the statute, namely, whether there is potential for an 
adverse effect on the market for the photograph should the challenged use become 
widespread.”). See Balganesh, supra note 73, at 55 (suggesting that the fourth fair use factor 
should “reced[e] in importance” when privacy interests are claimed through copyright). 
 283.  WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:159 (2019); Tehranian, supra note 
51, at 267–68. 
 284.  AIPLA, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-189 (2017), (the mean cost for 
copyright litigation inclusive of discovery, motions, and claim construction is $125,000; that 
goes up to $278,000 when including pre-trial, trial, post-trial, and appeal costs). 
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Furthermore, fair use is a multifactor and equitable test, and 
appellate circuits often develop their own idiosyncratic 
jurisprudence. Thus, even if courts started to adapt fair use 
principles to recognize privacy considerations (positively or 
negatively), it could take decades before those principles became 
predictable and recognized nationally. Congress could accelerate 
that process by amending the fair use statute, like it did to avoid 
overprivileging unpublished works285 after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.286 However, Congress has 
only made that one substantive statutory amendment to fair use in 
forty years. Courts cannot expect Congress to redress this issue. 
B. Attorneys’ Fees 
Section 505 of the Copyright Act authorizes courts to award 
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties at their discretion.287 In 
Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court reinforced that fees can be awarded 
to the prevailing party “even when the losing party advanced a 
reasonable claim or defense.”288 Therefore, courts have the power 
to award attorneys’ fees to defendants in cases seeking illegitimate 
copyright suppression. 
Such fee awards have two salutary benefits: they compensate 
the defendant for defending the content against illegitimate erasure 
in violation of public discourse and free speech principles, and they 
deter future plaintiffs from bringing copyright claims to suppress 
speech. Courts have already recognized the need to award 
attorneys’ fees in some memory hole cases,289 and the Kirtsaeng case 
should encourage courts to make such awards even more routine. 
C. Anti-SLAPP Law 
This Article has highlighted numerous examples of copyright 
lawsuits that are motivated by the desire to suppress already 
	
 285.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”). 
 286.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 287.  17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 288.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016). 
 289.  E.g., Katz v. Chevaldina, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2015); City of Inglewood 
v. Teixeira, No. CV-15-01815-MWF (MRWx), 2015 WL 6146269 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) 
Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-CV-01343-RLH, 2011 WL 5101938 (D. Nev. Oct.  
26, 2011). 
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published and socially beneficial speech—material that, in many 
cases, helps educate audiences about matters already circulating 
and in the public interest. As described in Part II, anti-SLAPP laws 
do two things: (1) they expedite dismissal of unmeritorious 
lawsuits by putting the burden on the plaintiff to establish their 
case in the complaint,290 and (2) they provide attorneys’ fee shifting 
for defendant-victims.291 Many privacy lawsuits framed as 
copyright cases are SLAPPs292 and should be treated as such. 
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no copyright enforcement 
action has been deemed a SLAPP.293 This reflects several factors, 
including the presence of anti-SLAPP laws only in state civil 
procedure law, not federal, and the general inapplicability of state 
procedural laws to federal substantive law claims. To remediate 
this, Congress should enact a federal anti-SLAPP law and have it 
apply to copyright claims that meet the statutory standards of 
suppressing socially beneficial speech.294 
Applying anti-SLAPP protection to copyright cases that are 
designed to advance privacy interests at the expense of socially 
beneficial speech would have several benefits, including: (1) 
accelerating dismissal of the case, which relieves defendants from 
time, money and harassment involved in fighting unmeritorious 
lawsuits; (2) narrowing the scope of discovery only to the merits of 
the anti-SLAPP motion, which curbs invasive and harassing 
discovery requests; (3) implicitly shifting the fair use burden to 
plaintiffs, who would have to establish the tenability of their case 
	
 290.  Instead of filing a motion to dismiss or a state-law equivalent (such as a demurrer), 
a SLAPP defendant typically files a “motion to strike.” 
 291.  Most state anti-SLAPP laws make such fee shifts mandatory. State Anti-SLAPP Law 
Scorecard, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-
protection/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). Others leave it to the judge’s discretion. At least one 
state, Washington, imposes a mandatory penalty in addition to the fee shift. WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(6)(a)(ii) (West 2016). 
 292.  Other examples can be found in Tehranian, supra note 51. 
 293.  In the one case we know of, Johnson v. Saunders, No. A104475, 2004 WL 1874671 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2004), a state court granted an anti-SLAPP motion to strike in response 
to a woman’s allegation that she had “copyrighted her name.” Her copyright claim was 
defective on several key grounds, including the fact that state courts do not have jurisdiction 
over federal copyright cases. Apparently, the Court interpreted the plaintiff’s name-related 
claim as a trademark claim, despite its labeling as a copyright claim. 
 294.  See Tehranian, supra note 51, at 283–86. 
Disclosure note: Professor Goldman is a member of the board of directors of the Public 
Participation Project, a non-profit organization advocating for a federal anti-SLAPP law. 
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in the complaint, including why obvious fair use defenses would 
not succeed; and (4) making fee-shifting mandatory, which 
provides defendants with more confidence in financial 
reimbursement than the copyright law’s discretionary fee shift that 
Section 505 provides. This may encourage more defendants to fight 
abusive copyright SLAPPs rather than acquiesce to plaintiffs’ 
demands. It would also discourage copyright owners from 
initiating unmeritorious lawsuits as they know that they would 
have an increased risk of paying the defense costs.295 
Enacting a federal anti-SLAPP law is a good idea.296 Providing 
enhanced protection for copyright defendants who are targeted for 
disseminating socially beneficial speech provides another 
compelling justification. 
D. Duration 
In numerous areas of privacy law, including many tort and 
constitutional claims, plaintiffs must be alive to have a right of 
action. This is justifiable because the fundamental value of privacy 
runs with the person. Why should copyright be any different when 
it is being used to assert similar kinds of claims? Instead, when 
copyright is asserted to protect privacy interests—to suppress 
private expression rather than to selectively or eventually 
disseminate it—the copyright duration should parallel that  
of privacy. 
When the privacy interest is asserted through or embedded in 
the copyrighted work, heirs to the copyright should not have 
standing to assert it, and neither should subjects. Moreover, when 
privacy is asserted through copyright, and the author voluntarily 
published the copyrighted work (despite the subject’s possible 
contrary interests), the claim of privacy by the author or subject 
(whether brought as a copyright claim or not) should be waived or 
limited to actual damages as it would in a privacy dispute. 
	
 295.  A related approach would be to strengthen 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012), which creates 
a cause of action for sending spurious copyright takedown notices. If § 512(f) were stronger, 
it would discourage copyright owners from seeking removals not grounded in legitimate 
copyright interests. 
 296.  Eric Goldman, 59 Legal Scholars Sign Letter Supporting SPEAK FREE Act to Create 
Federal Anti-SLAPP Law, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 2:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ericgoldman/%202015/09/16/59-legal-scholars-sign-letter-supporting-speak-free-act-to-
create-federal-anti-slapp-law/. 
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We do not seek to disturb the fundamental quid pro quo 
animating copyright law: that by giving some exclusive rights to 
copyright owners, society will benefit from the resulting works that 
are produced by that benefit. However, the quid pro quo function 
is not linear. Dialing up the protection for copyright benefits society 
to a point. After that point, overprotection for copyright law 
becomes a net detriment to society by excessively interfering with 
social discourse. This Article has explored one of those situations 
where expansive applications of copyright exclusivity leads to 
memory holes that are counterproductive to copyright’s purpose. 
Unquestionably, the rise of the Internet has exposed some 
doctrinal weaknesses in privacy law. Despite the legitimate and 
sometimes profound harms experienced by some privacy victims, 
copyright law should not be manipulated to fix privacy law’s 
problems.297 Instead, copyright law should remain focused on the 
purposes it is designed to serve. If those purposes coincidentally 
counsel in favor of redressing privacy violations—as they may with 
the unauthorized publication of never-disseminated works and 
limited other cases—then copyright law is the right tool. In all other 
cases, it is not the right tool; and attempts to stretch copyright law 
into a general-purpose privacy law pose a grave threat to free and 
diverse social discourse, and ultimately to our society.298 
 
	
 297.  McKeown, supra note 5, at 16 (“[C]opyright cannot be everything to 
everybody . . . No matter how noble and important the values of privacy and protection of 
reputation, copyright is not the direct vehicle for their vindication.”). 
 298.  Id. at 8 (“[A] weak copyright claim cannot hijack the First Amendment.”). 
